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ABSTRACT

Purpose
The purpose of this
senatorial
against

speeches for

study was

to analyze selected

and against using military force

Iraq.

Hypothesis
It was hypothesized that Richard Weaver's hierarchy of
argument will provide a useful

framework for

the

identification of arguments and philosophical inclination of
the speakers.
Materials
The primary documents comprising
four

this study were the

speeches found in Vital Speeches Q..f. the Day by Senator

Robert Dole (R-KS), Senator George Mitchell
John C.

Danforth <R-MO>.

<D-ME>. Senator

and Senator Sam Nunn <D-GA).

were delivered in the Senate between January 10-12.

All

1991.

The speakers chosen were well-respected members of the
Senate.
Methodology
Clark
Strickland.

&

Johannesen (1976-77) and Johannesen,

and Eubanks

(1970) have praised the late Richard

M. Weaver for his hierarchical division of arguments.
McClerren (1990) used Weaver's hierarchy to identify the
philosophical

starting points of those involved in the

debate over abortion.
Weaver's hierarchy of argument was employed to

analyze the senatorial speeches (Weaver, 1970, pp.
This method named several types of argument

201-225>.

(definition,

analogy, cause-effect, and testimony) and classifies them by
their perceived merit.
This study followed Weaver's hierarchy by showing how
the arguments used can help in identifying the philosophical
inclinations of the speaker.
Conclusion
The results of the study demonstrate that

the

hierarchy of argument Weaver created was an effective basis
for identifying philosophical inclinations and rhetorical
arguments.
All speakers favored argument by definition <Dole &
Danforth 9, Mitchell 8, and Nunn 6 uses each).
most favored argument was cause-effect
5, Dole & Nunn 4).

the next

(Mitchell 6, Danforth

Third was analogy (Dole 8, Danforth &

Nunn 4, Mitchell 2) and finally testimony <Nunn 9, Mitchell
4, Danforth 1, Dole 0).
All Senators leaned toward idealism.
Senators, Dole & Danforth,
arguments.

The pro-force

used the most idealistic

The anti-forces Senators <Mitchell & Nunn) used

more pragmatic and realistic arguments.
Suggestions for Further Research
Weaver's hierarchy should be further tested by
application to other speeches dealing with a variety of
political and social issues.

Criteria for the

identification of philosophy should be further refined.
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INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant military events to take
place in the post-Viet Nam era was the Persian Gulf War.

As

usual the president of the United States had to win majority
approval in both the House and Senate before he could order
troops into action.

While the troops waited in the sands of

Saudi Arabia congressional debate was at an impassioned
level.

The purpose of this study is to analyze selected

speeches given in the U.S. Senate in early January 1991
concerning the vote on using military force against Iraq in
the Persian Gulf.

A modified qualitative methodology

suggested by Richard Weaver concerning hierarchy of argument
will be the method of analysis.

Gulf War Debates
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CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH & METHODOLOGY

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this study is to analyze selected
senatorial speeches for and against using military
force against

Iraq from a rhetorical stand-point.

Hypothesis

It is hypothesized that Richard Weaver's hierarchy of
argument will provide a useful framework for the
identification of arguments and philosophical inclination.

Limitations of Study
This study will be limited to two speeches affirming
and two speeches negating President Bush's proposal to use
force against

Iraq.

Significance of Study
Because this study is an analysis of public debate, by
public officials, on matters that affect political policy it
will be of interest to those in the speech communication
field, especially those concerned with rhetoric and public
address, history. and political science.

Clark & Johannesen

Gulf War Debates
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(1977) contend that "One of Richard Weaver's most important

and controversial contributions to contemporary rhetorical
theory is the concept of the hierarchical ethical worth of
arguments."

It will also add to the literature which is

part of the growing field of political communication. This
study will also be of interest because of the scarcity of
communication literature on the Gulf War to date.

It may

prove to be a stepping-stone to further and more advanced
studies of Persian Gulf oratory.

Above all,

this study will

have personal significance to me, as a student and teacher
of communication.

Materials
The primary documents comprising this study are the
four speeches found in Vital Speeches of the Day: by Senator
Robert Dole, delivered to the Senate,

January 12, 1991:

Senator George Mitchell, delivered to the Senate,

January

10, 1991: Senator John C. Danforth, delivered to the Senate,

January 10, 1991: and Senator Sam Nunn, delivered to the
Senate,

January 10, 1991.

The primary sources of

biographical information were Current Biography and
Congressional Quarterly's: Politics in America.

Gulf War Debates
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE

While the Speech Communication Association Journals and
other recognized communication journals have not yet
published articles concerning the Persian Gulf Debates
volumes were written concerning the social and political
nature of the war and debates.
p.

One author

<Shanker,

1991,

7) did come up with a rhetorical article demonstrating

how in the debates

the congressmen leaned heavily on

recalling history.

He said that congressmen quoted

Socrates, Lincoln, Augustine, Aquinas, Madison,
Churchill.

They also alluded to the Mexican-American War,

The Peloponnesian War, World Wars
He added that

I and II,

and Viet Nam.

"no one could have followed the debates or had

an intelligent opinion about
the Gulf without at
(1991, p.

and

least

the wisest course of action in

a basic knowledge of history"

7).

Both liberal and conservative voices were heard.
Oliver North's publication The Free American (1991)
published the names of all congressmen who voted against
President and featured
was noted <Kondracke,
Gulf War was

the first

some of their ill-fated quotes.
1991, pp.

11-12)

that

the
It

the Persian

"Republican" war as all others were

entered into by Democrats and that

the G.O.P.

again was

credited as being the "strength party" while the democrats
got pinned with looking weak.
<D-NY)

said he could not accept

Representative Stephen Solarz
the Viet Nam analogy and

Gulf War Debates
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predicted a "decisive victory in months.
<Kondracke, Feb.

7-14,

1991, p.

18).

if not weeks"

Barnes

(1991)

explained how Bush managed to form a coalition of
Republicans and helpful Democrats in order to show bipartisan strength.
Other articles depicted the whole effort as a
presidential power play aimed at

shifting attention from the

ailing economy and to make Bush look strong.

An un-named

author in Commonweal considered the ethical dimensions of
the war and ended by questioning why we are so eager to fix
the rest of the world while we ourselves lie in such
disrepair

(1991, pp.

115-117).

switch from sanctions
Hussein a hero,
U.S.

to force was a mistake which made

inflamed Arab nationalism,

to lose credibility with the U.N.

Kownacki
market
faces

White claimed that Bush's

(1991, pp.

(1991. pp.

118-119).

119-120) noted sadly how we managed to

the patriotism of war while not

showing the human

that were the victims of destruction.

harsh in his criticism,

(1991, pp.

Hehir

is

less

setting forth a criteria to justify

going to war and concluding that
but unwise"

and caused the

125-126).

the war effort was "just

Gulf War Debates
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Kuwait

In 1991 Kuwait observed its thirtieth official year of
independence.

Although their independence is officially

only thirty years old,

the kingdom-sheikdom of Kuwait dates

to ancient Greek, Persian, and Indian times.

Present day

Kuwait covers a 17,820 square kilometer area on the northwestern corner of the Arabian Gulf between latitudes 28 and
30 north and longitudes 46 and 48 east
12).

<Al-Barges, 1986, p.

The population exceeds 1.7 million.
Kuwait has been an important commercial port in the

Persian Gulf since the eighteenth century.
being that
country.

The only problem

the surrounding countries coveted the small port
Well aware of this Sheik Mubarak-Al-Subah signed a

treaty with Britain in 1899 guaranteeing that Britain would
protect it in return for the promise that Kuwait would
neither come under foreign leadership nor sell any part of
Kuwait without Britain's consent.

In 1922 Sheik Ahmed Al-

Jaber signed a peace agreement which demarcated the
boundaries of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

By 1950 the

development of Kuwait's oil reserves and its adoption of
western governmental practices caused it to become a
developed industrial nation.
Al-Salem,

On June 1961, Sheik Abdullah

together with the British Political Resident,

agreed to abrogate the 1899 treaty allowing Kuwait to become

Gulf War Debates
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a fully independent

state (Hamoud Al-Barges. 1986, pp.

26-

27 ) .

Iraq

Present day Iraq has only existed since 1920 when the
British government mandated its existence.

It has a land

area of 170.000 square miles and a population of over 14
million (Marr, 1985. p.

1).

Its borders are British

prescribed and largely artificial.

As a result

they have

been a source of challenge from within and without

since

Iraq's conception.
Before British occupation of the land.

the Ottoman

Turks held and exercised great influence over Iraq (Marr.
1985. p.

19).

Their influence on the customs and culture of

Iraq are second only to the Arab-Muslim predominance of the
area.

The British impact includes Iraq's drive toward

modernization. Arabization of government. and the creation
of an Iraqi nationalist movement

spear-headed by officials

largely placed in power by the British themselves
1985. p.

<Marr.

29).

Although Britain mandated Iraq in 1920 it wasn't until
1929 that a newly elected Labor government announced Iraq's
admission into the League of Nations and three years later
signed a treaty recognizing Iraq's independence.
following decades a growing movement

In the

toward Arab unity

developed epitomized by the Ba'thist party (Saddam's vehicle

Gulf War Debates
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of power).

Under King Ghazi some parties in Iraq called for

the uniting of Iraq and Kuwait based on the fact

that Kuwait

had once been part of the administrative district of Basra
during the Ottoman period (Ghareeb, 1986, p. 61).
Fortunately for the Kuwaitis the British consistently
opposed this idea.
Once the British granted sovereignty to Kuwait in 1961
Iraqi leader Abd al-Karim Qasim attempted to annex Kuwait
claiming that the nation "arbitrarily held by imperialism"
now belonged to Iraq.

This appeal was ended with the

installation of an official Ba'thist government in 1963 that
was not as concerned with having Kuwait at the time.
There was a good rapport between the two countries
during the seventies.

During the eighties Iraq was

preoccupied with its war against Iran.

Kuwait was actually

somewhat of an ally to Iraq during the war, supplying Iraq
with billions in loans,

some interest-free, and supplying

Iraqi oil customers with their own in order to continue
Iraq's oil revenues (Crusoe, 1986, p.

34 ) •

However, Iraq emerged from the war as the largest Arab
power with the fourth largest army in the world.

By 1989 it

had 99 brigades and 1,080,000 men, plus the republican
guard, popular army forces, and a huge air force.

Since

that time it has imported weapons at three times the rate of
Iran and has built a military-industrial complex which is
the mainstay of Iraqi industry.

By this time Iraq saw

itself as the regional power fit

to unify the Arab world.

Gulf War Debates
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In order to have
their way with Kuwait

Iraq tried to take Saudi Arabia and

Bahrain out of the picture through security agreements
signed in 1989 calling for non-interference in internal
affairs and banning the use of force

<Meguid. et al. 1990 p.

3 3).

Annexing Kuwait may have been an aim of Iraq for
decades but it wasn't until August 2.

1990 that

they claimed

Kuwait rightly belonged to Iraq and sent in the tanks.

The War

On August 2, 1990 the world was shocked as the Iraqi
army rolled through Kuwait,
south.

Iraq's small neighbor to the

Shortly thereafter came the announcement by Iraq's

leader. Saddam Hussein,

that

Iraq had officially annexed

Kuwait and that he had no intention of withdrawing then. or
ever.
The United Nations almost immediately condemned the
action as a violent expansionist move on the part of Iraq.
Under the orchestration of U.S. president George Bush
economic sanctions were quickly agreed upon by most U.N.
member nations and imposed against Iraq.
A few days after the invasion President Bush was on
the airwaves explaining why he was deploying U.S.
the area.

troops to

As he spoke plane and ship loads of U.S.

military personnel and equipment were on there way to Saudi

Gulf War Debates
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Arabia to set up a protective defense code-named "Operation
Desert Shield."
This action was taken because Bush had doubts that
economic sanctions alone would be enough flush Iraq out of
Kuwait and was busy working for more clout, both in the U.N.
and the U.S. Congress.

His problem was that he faced a

Democratically controlled Congress that was not anxious to
go to war and a U.N.
solution.

that wanted, above all, a diplomatic

He gained U.N.

support for

the use of force when

all diplomatic efforts with Iraq failed.
tougher nut

to crack.

The Congress was a

Many congressmen and women were

already angry that Bush had deployed troops without

their

consent and outwardly he seemed to be saying that he did not
need it--that he was acting within his legitimate powers as
the president.
The major point of constitutional contention was
Article 1, Section 8 which states that "the Congress shall
have power ... to declare war."
trying to do so on his own.

Many felt

the president was

Of the nine wars that have been

declared only The War of 1812 was debated beforehand.

As a

result of the gradual escalation of the Viet Nam conflict
and the lives of U.S.

soldiers lost in the process Congress

enacted the War Powers Resolution in 1973 which requires the
president

to report

to Congress when the U.S.

enters

"hostilities or situations where imminent involvement is
necessary"

(Orrick, March 1991, p. 67).

In late December Bush persuaded the U.N.

to issue a

Gulf War Debates
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deadline for Iraqi withdrawal:

January 15, 1991.

Meanwhile

Congress was debating whether to allow the president
force if Iraq did not withdraw by the deadline.

to use

Congress

finally voted to authorize the use of force on January 12,
1991.
The January 15 deadline passed and Iraq did not
withdraw.

Within a day the multi-national force began

bombing and Operation Desert Shield became Operation Desert
Storm.

The nation sat glued to their television sets as the
After weeks of bombing a ground-war

bombing continued.

ensued on Sunday, February 24 resulting in a decisive
American victory.

President Bush ordered a cease-fire at

midnight Wednesday. February 27 exactly one-hundred hours
after the assault began.

The Debates

The senatorial debates on whether or not

to go to war

in the Persian Gulf against Iraq were extremely intense
resulting in a narrow (52-47) victory for George Bush.
Adding to the intensity was the fact

that

these were the

first congressional debates concerning war powers to be
completely televised (via C-Span).
selected by Reader's Digest

The following quotes

(March, 1991) suggest

the

intensity of the debates.

Anti-forces:
Voting against

the resolution David Boren <D. Okla.)

Gulf War Debates
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said, "Not a single one of us can escape the judgement of
history which will be rendered upon the actions we take
today." Sen.

Paul Wellstone CD, Minn.) prophesied, "If we

rush to war, it will be a nightmare in the Persian Gulf.
Our country will be torn apart ... " Sen.

Edward Kennedy <D.

Mass.) said that the 45,000 body bags the Pentagon has sent
to the region are all the evidence we need of the high price
in lives and blood that we will have to pay."

Ernest F.

Hollings asked, "Is Kuwait worth the life of a GI?
all."

Not at

Sen. Terry Sanford CD. N.C.) said, "We are going to

see this nation go to a war that certainly does not need to
be fought--the most unnecessary war in the history of this
nation." Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan belittled the whole effort
stating. "nothing large has happened.

A nasty little

country invaded a littler but just as nasty country"
(Congressional Record,

Jan. 1-15, 1991).

Pro-forces a
A small majority of senators felt

just as strongly

that decisive military action was needed.
resolution, Sen.

Voting for the

Malcom Wallop (R, Wyo.) said, "The time to

act in now, while we have the advantage, while we have the
means amassed in the right place and while we can keep the
loss of life at a minimum.
the ultimate price.

To prolong the crisis bids up

Can we not summon the courage to make

clear to the American people what is at stake and what their
sons are being asked to fight

for?

The President has.

Cannot this body have the courage to do the same?"

Gulf War Debates
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(Congressional Record,

Jan.

1-15, 1991).

The president's supporters felt
could restore Kuwait's

that

the use of force

legitimate government.

stabilize the

Persian Gulf. maintain access to middle-east oil. neutralize
Iraq's chemical. biological. and nuclear threat. and pave
the way for a new world order based on international law.
They also feared the coalition would dissolve before
economic sanctions took effect.
felt

that

The president's opponents

sanctions could work if given enough time.

feared that

the cost

They

in lives and resources would be too

great. exacerbating existing domestic problems.

Sanctions

and diplomacy was by and large the anti-force line.
The debate lasted many days with impassioned and
eloquent voices being heard on both sides of the issue.
Covering every speech would prove to be too cumbersome.
therefore a handful of highly visible representative
speakers had to be chosen.

SELECTION OF SPEAKERS AND SPEECHES

Narrowing the selection of representative speakers for
both sides of the issue was a difficult

task.

First.

I

attempted to read through the Congressional Record to
discover speeches of comparable intensity and length.
volume of material was overwhelming.
impossible to get perfectly equal

As a result.

texts.

The

it was

Some speeches were

Gulf War Debates
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Some were brief.

long.

brief remarks.

Next.

Some speakers yielded to others for

I wrote both Illinois Senators and

asked them to identify the best speeches pro and con.
only reply came from Sen. Paul Simon <D.
is found in the appendix.

My

Ill.)--whose letter

I considered selecting

transcripts from C-Span but decided against

the idea because

the Congressional record would provide approximately the
same material with hard copy.

My search for representative

speeches ended with the February 1. 1991 issue of Vital
Speeches of the Day which featured speeches by four senators
(two for

the resolution and two against).

The four speeches were by Senators Robert Dole <R.
KS).

John Danforth <R. MO). George Mitchell <D. ME). and Sam

Nunn <D. GA).

Dole and Danforth spoke in favor of the

resolution while Mitchell and Nunn spoke against
fact

that

The

these speakers were chosen by Vital Speeches alone

make their speeches worthy of study but
reasons.

it.

there are other

All four speakers are highly visible members of

the Senate with records

that make them good spokesmen on the

issue.

Sen. Robert Dole

Bob Dole is a senior Republican Senator from the state
of Kansas.

Born on July 22. 1923 in Russell. Kansas to a

middle class family. he attended University of Kansas from
1941 to 1943 until he enlisted in the army.

He became a war

Gulf War Debates
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hero of sorts, winning the bronze star,
was elevated to the rank of captain.
fully from his war injury.

He lost

the purple heart and

He has never recovered
the use of his right arm

and has only partial use of his left arm.

After his army

career he got his bachelors and law degrees from Washburn
University;

the last in 1952.

Dole's political career began in the Kansas House in
1951.

After that he became the Russell County Attorney, was

elected to the U. S. House of Representatives, and then to
the Senate.

He was the Republican nominee for vice-

president in 1976, and ran for president in 1980 and 1988.
His aggressive style got him the post of majority leader in
the 1971 Senate and remains the minority leader in a now
Democratically controlled Senate.

A political workaholic he

sits on four committees: Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry; Finance; Rules and Administration; and Joint
Taxation.

He has historically been a champion of Republican

conservatism and conservative presidential administrations
as well as a watchdog for Democratic ones (Moritz. 1972, pp.
107-109; Duncan, 1989, pp.

Sen.

Speaking also for
President

552-556).

John Danforth

the resolution to authorize the

to use force was Republican Senator John C.

Danforth of Missouri.
September, 5. 1936.

Danforth was born in St. Louis
He holds degrees in religion from
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Princeton and law from Yale and has practiced in both areas.
From 1969 to 1977 he was the Attorney General of Missouri.
Danforth is noted as having made one of the more
successful transitions from majority to minority status in
the Senate. having lost little influence and effectiveness.
He has worked well with Democrats in many areas including a
successful partnership with Lloyd Bentsen who assumed his
position as chairman of the Finance Subcommittee on Trade.
His position on abortion causes him to stand out clearly
however.

He has been behind various legislation cutting

state funds for abortion.

In 1989 he moved from the Budget

Committee to the Select Committee on Intelligence and has
worked well with Democrats there.
Although in this debate they are on opposite sides of
the issue Danforth had earlier teamed up with George
Mitchell of Maine to restore credit for
investments.

low-income housing

Deeply concerned about world hunger. he helped

win some $150 million in aid for Africa after touring the
drought ravaged continent <Duncan. 1989. pp. 841).
Danforth's membership on the Select Intelligence
Committee afforded him special insight with which to
consider and make judgement on Iraq's capacity for war.

His

former membership on the finance committee. including his
ranking membership on the subcommittee concerning
international trade made him capable of sound judgement on
the economic ramifications of both sanctions and military
action.

Having also been a member of the Committee for
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Commerce, Science and Transportation makes him keenly aware
of the effect Iraq can have on the world's oil supply
(Duncan, 1989, pp. 840-843).

Sen. George Mitchell
Speaking against

the authorization of force was George

J. Mitchell <Dern. - Maine).
1933 in Waterville, Maine.
Bowdoin College and an LL.B.

Mitchell was born August 20,
His degrees include a B.A.

from

from Georgetown University and

spent two years in the army.
Starting out as a lawyer Mitchell has made for himself
a successful legal-political career.

In 1966 he became the

Maine Democratic Party Chairman and held that position until
1968.

In 1974 he made an unsuccessful run for governor of

Maine as the Democratic nominee.

Later he was appointed by

Jimmy Carter as U.S. Attorney General for Maine.

His close

relationship with Edmund Muskie landed him this position and
gained him national attention.

He was a federal

judge when

he was appointed to fill a vacant Senate seat from Maine.
He won his first bid for re-election hands down and kept
moving steadily but cautiously upward, winning .the
prestigious title of Senate Majority Leader.

Always a

Reagan antagonist Mitchell once said after the 1986 State of
the Union speech that the president uses "rhetoric that
refuses to face the real world" (Duncan, 1989, p. 637).
However, his major political focus since he arrived in the
Senate seems to be the environment, which may explain his

Gulf War Debates
25

reluctance to go to war

in the crude oil

As a member of the Committee for

laden Persian Gulf.

the Environment

and Public

Works he worked on increasing the "Superfund" bill which
requires chemical companies

to finance hazardous-waste

cleanup, creating a $30 million program for compensation of
victims of toxic incidents, cutting down acid rain,
reauthorizing the Clean Water Act.

and

Mitchell also serves on

the Finance Committee and the Committee for Veterans'
Affairs

<Duncan,

1989, pp.

636-639).

Sen. Samm Nunn
Sam Nunn (Dem.-Georgia) also spoke against
authorization of force in the Persian Gulf.
in Perry, GA on September, 8,
one important

the

Nunn was born

1938 to farming parents.

His

tie to politics being his great-uncle Carl

Vinson who chaired the House Armed Services Committee.
spent

three years at

He

the Georgia Institute of Technology

before signing up with the Coast Guard.

When he returned he

obtained a bachelors and law degree from Emory University.
Before being elected to the Senate in 1972 he spent

three

years in the Georgia House.
Senator Nunn is highly noted for his expertise on the
defense.

As one writer states,

deacon's:

sober, deliberate and stern, his work ethic well

worn.

"Nunn's demeanor is a church

But on matter of national defense, he wears

priest's robes.

the high

He retreats into a mountain of facts

emerges with opinions

and

that exert broad influence on defense

Gulf War Debates
26
policy"

(Duncan.

1989. p.

351).

After

touring NATO more

than once he recommended forces be beefed up there in order
that

the U.S. might not have to rely so heavily on a solely

nuclear

threat.

Although he criticized the way Reagan

managed defense funds he always approved of his defense
spending increases. highly uncharacteristic of a Democrat.
However.

it was his conservatism which got him where he is

today propelled into office by the conservative Democratic
Southern voters.
In the past he has called for a reinstitution of the
draft and submitted legislation requiring eighteen-year-old
males

to register with the Selective Service.

successfully opposed the nominations of

He

John Tower as

Secretary of Defense and Robert Bork to the Supreme Court

in

partisan debate which removed some of his non-partisan
reputation.

After Tower's rejection Bob Dole accused Nunn

of gazing longingly across

the Potomac at

leading a Democratic power grab (Duncan.
Moritz.

1980. pp.

the Pentagon and
1989. pp.

351-354;

285-288).

Domestically Nunn has concentrated on social welfare.
education.

and rural and urban development but his great

strength lies in his defense knowledge.

Other committees he

has served on include Governmental Affairs. Select
Intelligence and Small Business.

Many feel he would make a

good Democratic candidate for President but he has yet
fulfill

their wishes.

Jimmy Carter.

He once jokingly said.

that he doesn't

to

referring

think the nation will want

to
to
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see another Georgian President in his life time (Duncan.
1989. p.

351)."

METHODOLOGY

Concerning Richard M. Weaver. Kirschke (1979) called
him "one of the clearest

thinkers of the twentieth century"

and suggested that he has not received the critical
attention he deserves.

Gaynor (1979) depicted Weaver as a

brilliant conservative thinker who "primarily concerned
himself with the ideas of the intellectual and political
leaders of society."

Clark & Johannesen (1976-77) and

Johannesen. Strikland 1 & Eubanks

(1970) have praised Weaver

for his hierarchical division of arguments.
(1990) used Weaver's hierarchy to pin-point

McClerren
the

philosophical frameworks of those involved in the debate
over abortion.
The methodology I will employ to analyze the speeches
of these four Senators is adapted from the late Richard M.
Weaver's hierarchy of argument

(1970, pp.

201-225).

Weaver's hierarchy identifies several types of argument and
classifies them by their perceived merit.
names.

in the order which he lists them.

definition,

The types that he
include argument by

similitude (analogy). cause-effect, and

testimony (1970

1

p.

209).
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Hierarchy Q.f. Argument

Arguing from Definition

Concerning argument by definition he speaks of
essence.

"One way to interpret a subject is to define its

nature--to describe the fixed features of its being.
Definition is an attempt

to capture essence.

When we speak

of the nature of a thing, we speak of something we expect
persist.

to

Definitions accordingly deal with fundamental and

unchanging properties"

(1970, p.

209).

Arguing from

definition then uses the thing referred to and speaks of its
implicit characteristics.

Simply put Weaver (1974, p.

137)

says that "all arguments made from the nature of a thing"
are definition.

For instance, when addressing the slavery

issue Abraham Lincoln always argued that
human.

In this argument

the negro was fully

the negro was the subject and his

humanity was his essence or one of his chief implicit
characteristics.

Once this definition is established all

other rights must necessarily follow, e.g.,
right

freedom,

the

to vote, paid employment, etc.
Weaver classifies argument by definition as the

highest

form of argument.

His reason is a metaphysical one

which holds that being, not becoming,
reality.

(1970, p.

212).

is the highest

This metaphysical belief

"ascribes to the highest reality qualities of stasis,
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immutability,

[and] eternal perdurance."

It is really the

simple assertion that "that which is perfect does not change
and that which has to change is less perfect" (Weaver, 1970,
p. 212).

The one who can argue from unchanging essences

therefore is the one who speaks of what is most real.
Many,

in this age of pseudo-relativism, would argue

that there are no fixed realities or transcendent values.
However,

to make a statement of this nature is only to prove

their existence.

Would it not be a fixed reality that there

were no universals if, in fact,

there were none?

Even if it

were true that there were only a few the very use of one
would indeed constitute the highest form of argument.
When the framers of the Declaration of Independence
decided that they "hold these truths to be self evident,
that all men are created equal ... " they were arguing from
definition.

They defined the human being as a creature who

is inherently entitled to these rights regardless of opinion
otherwise.

In their thinking these entitlements were

transcendent realities, precisely what Richard Weaver was
explaining.

While this type of argument would not lend

itself to external verification it is hard to refute since
every individual, whether under democracy or tyranny.

feels

the need for these things.
Similitude or analogy
The next highest form of argument in Weaver's
hierarchy is similitude or analogy.

This type. he asserts,
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is favored by imaginative types--poets, writers, etc.

When

our knowledge of a subject presents only probable proof we
employ analogy because it relates the subject
know more about.

to one that we

"All analogy depends upon a theory that if

two things resemble in a certain number of respects,
probable that
(Weaver,

they resemble in still further respects"

1974, p.

142).

Analogy infers that

essence to the subject even though it
apparent.

there is an

is not readily

In Weaver's mind then, analogy is one step

removed from definition.

He explains

analogies are employed for tact,
reason out

it is

the assertion for

Of similitude he says,

that

sometimes

allowing the audience to

themselves.
"A [good] way to interpret a

subject is in terms of relationships of similarity and
dissimilarity.

We say that

it is like something which we

know in fuller detail, or that
important respects.

it is unlike that

thing in

From such a comparison a conclusion

regarding the subject itself can be drawn.

This is a very

common form of argument, by which probabilities can be
established.

And since probabilities are all we have to go

on in many questions of this life,
usable means of persuasion"

it must be accounted a

(1970, p.

call this type of argument analogy.

209).

We commonly

Jesus' message about

the Kingdom of God was always communicated through analogy.
"The kingdom of God is

like a mustard seed ... a lost coin ... a

pearl of great price ... wheat and tares, etc."
Scripture says,

As the

"without a parable spake he not unto them"
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(Matthew 13:34, KJV).
Weaver (1970, p. 214) sets forth a cosmological
example of analogy, saying,
"The cosmos is one vast system of analogy, so that our
profoundest intuitions of it are made in the form of
comparisons.
To affirm that something is like
something else is to begin to talk about the
unitariness of creation.
Everything is like everything
else somehow, so that we have a ladder of similitude
mounting up to the final one-ness--to something like a
unity in godhead.
Furthermore, there is about this
source of argument a kind of decent reticence, a
recognition of the unknown along with the known.
There
is a recognition that the unknown may be continuous
with the known, so that man is moving about in a world
only partly realized, yet real in all its parts."
Weaver's choice of similitude as the second form of argument
in his hierarchy undoubtedly stems from the fact

that he

believed rhetoric to be a largely humanistic enterprise,
lending itself to qualitative, rather than quantitative,
analysis.

Arguing from Cause-Effect

Weaver (1971) says, "another way to interpret a
subject is to place it in a cause-and-effect relationship.
The process of interpretation is then to affirm it as the
cause of some effect or as the effect of some cause.

And

the attitudes of those who are listening will be affected
according to whether or not they agree with our cause-andeffect analysis" (p.

209).

For instance, someone might

argue that the lack of national emission control standards
on automobiles is the cause of high levels of carbon-dioxide
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in the air.

Air pollution would be the perceived effect

with lack of regulations the cause.

"The rhetorical force

of the
argument depends upon our acceptance of the truth of the
cause-and-effect relationship which is affirmed in the major
premise" (Weaver, 1974, p. 140).
Cause-effect is the third type of argument in Weaver's
hierarchy.

Although he is not overly impressed with cause-

effect reasoning he admits that we cannot escape its use
because we are historical people.

All historical events are

either causes of some effect or effects of some cause.
Metaphysically speaking, cause-effect reasoning "operates in
the realm of becoming" as opposed to being (Weaver, 1970, p.
214).

The idealist Weaver, who advocates being over

becoming, notes that the primary users of cause-effect
reasoning are pragmatic thinkers.
Weaver (1970) tells us, "It is not unusual today to
find a lengthy piece of journalism or an entire political
speech which is nothing but a series of arguments from
consequence--completely devoid of reference to principle or
defined ideas.

We rightly recognize these as sensational

types of appeal" (p.

214).

He argues that cause-effect

argument offers the temptation to overuse fear appeals by
overemphasizing the negative effect of some cause.

Many

today (environmentalists, et al.) are guilty of this very
thing.

For instance, we are warned so incessantly about the

"green-house effect," which still remains a theory,

that we
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begin to believe that it is already coming to pass.
An even poorer sub-variety of this type of argument is
argument from circumstance which doesn't even offer a causeeffect relationship.

Circumstance. Weaver argues.

nothing more than a "surrender of reason."

is

He considers it

acceptable only when there is nothing left to plead.

An

example we hear constantly is "we must adapt ourselves to a
fast changing world."

This oft-quoted saying offers no good

reasons why we should change with the world nor what would
happen if we did not.

Circumstance.

subsumed by cause-effect which.

in this methodology.

is

in general. "is a lower-

order source of argument because it deals in the realm of
the phenomenal" which is easily "converted into the
sensational." something all true scholars diligently try to
avoid (1970. p.

215).

Testimony

Argument from testimony is last in Weaver's hierarchy
but is not necessarily the lowest form.

When a person

argues from testimony some authority on a given subject is
cited.
Weaver (1974. p. 146) says that arguments based on
testimony "have no intrinsic force."

Whatever power they

carry comes from the weight of the authority.

Some of the

proposed experts are indeed expert and some are questionable
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at best.

For example. concerning political matters one

could cite Henry Kissinger or Lyndon LaRouche.

The person

one cites says much about his or her intelligence and
discretion.
Weaver says.

"the sound maxim is

based on authority is

that an argument

[only] as good as the authority"

(p.

When applying the methodology that will be taken into

214).

account.
Testimony uses the knowledge or opinion of another who
has more authority to comment on the subject under dispute.
Weaver

(1970. pp.

209-210) says.

"If we are not

in position

to see or examine. but can procure the deposition of one who
is.

the deposition may become the substance of our argument.

We can slip it into syllogism just as we would a defined
term.

The same is true of general statements which come

from quarters of great authority or prestige."

Quoting a

child-psychologist concerning children's affective issues or
citing the Bible on a moral issue are both instances of
testimony.

PHILOSOPHIES AND ARGUMENTS

Weaver hints at

the idea that

the type of arguments

useds lends insight into the speaker's personal philosophy.
When discussing the arguments he says.

"In reading or

interpreting the world of reality. we make use of four very
general ideas.

The first

three are usually expressed.

in
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the language of philosophy. as being. cause. and
relationship.

(1970. pp.

208-209)"

Later he adds,

"the

rhetorician is faced with a choice of means in appealing to
those whom he can prevail upon to listen to him.
at all philosophical.

If he is

it must occur to him to ask whether

there is a standard by which the sources of persuasion can
be ranked"

(1970. p.

211).

The arguments used should lend insight into the
speakers' philosophical starting points.
difficult

While it would be

to pin-point a speaker's philosophical stance

from just one speech it would not be difficult
hypothesize about

to

their general philosophical inclination.

Using some of the general philosophies covered in Donald
Butler's Four Philosophies I will make some generalizations
about

the philosophical inclinations of each speaker from

the arguments they use.

BUTLER'S "FOUR PHILOSOPHIES"

The four philosophies that will be outlined here are
the broad categories of naturalism.
pragmatism.

idealism, realism. and

I will briefly summarize the metaphysics.

epistemology. and axiology of each philosophy along with its
corresponding types of argument.
for speech analysis.

thus providing a framework
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IDEALISM

Metaphysics a
Metaphysically idealism holds that we are "real
existent beings. not transitory illusions. not dreams or
fancies"

<Butler. 1968. p. 147).

Not only is the self real

but it is either part of or the house of the soul.

"The

counterpart of the idealists' belief in the reality of self
is his belief in the world about him •..

it is spiritual,

made of the same stuff as self" <Butler. 1968. p. 150).

The

world around the idealist is made up of another substance
and "is a logically related system" (Butler. 1968. p.

15 2).

The universe contains distinctively mental realities which
are ultimately personal.

It is part of the Absolute Self

(God?) who thinks. perceives. feels and wills" <Butler.
1968. p.

153).

Epistemology a
The epistemology of idealism is like realism in that
the "qualities we perceive in the world are rooted in
existence of the self and that

'since nothing can be

conceived to exist without being in relation to other
things. many idealists believe Reality to be a logically
unified total system, a Universal Mind'" (Butler. 1968, p.
168).
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Axiology:
The axiology (value system) of idealism can be
explained in the following propositions.
rooted in existence.

Human values are

Human values are such because there

are humans to possess and enjoy them.

"Individual persons

can realize value by actively relating parts and wholes"
<Butler, 1968, p. 175).

For instance, a person must realize

that he is a part of the whole society in which he lives in
order to function harmoniously within that society.
Finally, unlike pragmatism, idealism sees value as being
rooted in absolutes or universals.

Arguments a
Idealists would probably tend to use definition more
than any other type of argument because arguments from
definition are not unlike ideals.

The idealist believes in

first principles or absolutes, ideas who's essence is
unchanging.

Weaver (1970, p. 209) says that "Definition is

an attempt to capture essence."

When explaining the

superiority of definition, he says that his judgement "goes
back to a very primitive metaphysics, which holds that
highest reality is being [idealism], not becoming."

the

He

continues, "It is a quasi-religious metaphysics because it
ascribes to the highest reality qualities of stasis,
immutability,

[and] eternal perdurance" (Weaver, 1970, p.

209).
Analogy would be the second choice of the idealist
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because it hints at first principles.

"Behind every analogy

lurks the possibility of a general term"
213).

(Weaver, 1970, p.

Weaver adds, "the user of analogy is hinting at an

essence which cannot at

the moment be produced." Therefore,

the idealist prefers analogy for virtually the same
reasons he or she prefers definition.
Finally,

the idealist would use testimony if it tended

to be highly authoritative or traditional, e.g. The Bible,
the Constitution,

the Magna Carta, etc.

NATURALISM

Naturalism may be the oldest Western philosophy since
some of the earliest figures in our history of philosophy
were naturalists, e.g., Thales-- sixth century B.C.-- who
decided that water was the common denominator of all
substances <Butler, 1968, p.

49).

Metaphysics1
Metaphysically speaking, naturalism may be divided
into two camps: naive and critical naturalism.

"Naive

naturalism includes all attempts to designate some one
substance as the be-all and end-all of Nature, and therefore
existence itself" (Butler, 1968, p.
the materialists and the energists.

70).

This camp includes

Critical naturalists

believe naive naturalism is too simplistic and prefer to
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view the universe in terms of process rather than substance.
Included in this camp are the positivists, who place much
emphasis on universal laws. causes and effects <Butler.
1968. pp.

71-72).

Epistemology:
Concerning knowledge (epistemology) Butler says.
"Naturalism is a distinct philosophy by virtue of its
insistence that reality and Nature are identical. and beyond
that there is no reality" (Butler. 1968. p. 73).

The naive

naturalists deal with the knowledge process as an instance
of motion.

The object moves toward the knower who perceives

it through his senses (Butler. 1968. p.

74).

The critical

naturalists exalt scientific method as the ultimate tool of
knowledge. e.g .• Comte, Bacon's inductive reasoning.

Comte

held "that the scientific level of insight was superior to
the theological and metaphysical because it recognized no
substantial abiding element in reality" (Butler. 1968. p.
76).

Thus.

there are no absolutes.

Axiology:
Naturalists hold that value is inherent in nature and
that in order to grasp greater value one must
harmony with nature (Butler. 1968, p.

79).

live in

This smacks of

Eastern philosophy which denies a personal creator.

It i s

hedonistic in the sense that the highest good is synonymous
with the highest pleasure.

Evil is a fact of nature as well

Gulf War Debates
40

as good.

Naturalists do not accept what

they consider man-

made or prescribed values <Butler, 1968, pp.

79-83).

Arguments:

Since the naturalists reject absolutes, except those
in nature,

they would tend to stay away from definition

except in cases concerning the environment.
be of little use either.

Testimony would

They would, more than likely, use

cause-effect since they view nature as a system of causes
and effects (Butler, 1968, p. 76).

Also because cause-

effect reasoning is more scientific in method.
Analogy might be used some since nature is full of
analogies (i.e.

fables, parables, etc.).

Weaver (1970, p.

214) says, "The cosmos [nature] is one vast system of
analogy, so that our profoundest intuitions of it are made
in the form of comparisons."

He adds,

"to affirm that

something
is like something else is to begin to talk about
unitariness of creation."

the

Butler ( 1968, p. 73) holds that,

"naturalism is a distinct philosophy by virtue of its
insistence that reality and Nature are identical."
Circumstance, a sub-variety of cause-effect, would be
used by naturalists since the circumstances of nature
dictate certain actions.

For instance, a naturalist might

argue that going to war in the Persian Gulf is not an option
because of all

the pollution that would be caused by the

burning oil fields.
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Definition would be used by the naturalist only if it
hinted at a value or essence that were inherent in nature.
Any human revelation would be suspect.
to testimony.

The same would apply

If the testimony were scientifically proven

or apparent in nature it would be acceptable to naturalists.
Also, using the testimony of natural scientists,

like

astronomer Karl Sagan, would be favorable.

REALISM

"Naturalism builds upon the confidence most people
have in the orderliness and dependability of Nature.
Idealism is a comprehensive philosophy which has resulted
from intellectualizing the common belief in the reality of
mind and self.

Correspondingly, realism is the refinement

of our common acceptance of the world as being just what it
appears

to be"

<Butler,

1968, p.

270).

Metaphysics:

It

is difficult

to find a common metaphysical

running through the branches of realism.

theme

Among the sub-

groups are pluralism and determinism <Butler, 1968, pp.
270-275).
they feel

Pluralists believe in a non-unified cosmos which
liberates the human spirit.

the idea of free will, arguing that
of the universe dictate what

Determinists reject

the causes and effects

is to be.

Neither doubt

reality of existence and tend to take the world, and

the
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themselves at face value.

Epistemology1
There are two major positions dividing the
epistemology of realism: monism and dualism.

Monism says

that objects are "presented." not "represented." in the
consciousness.

The object that is in the knower's

consciousness is the same object that is in the external
world.

Mind is not merely something within the brain.

Dualists disagree. noting that "it is important to
distinguish the object in consciousness from the combination
of physical forces which produced that object in
consciousness" (But 1 er • 19 6 8. p. 2 7 2) .

Axiology1
The two realistic theories of value are that values
are "simple indefinable elements" which we attach worth to
or that values depend upon the attitude of the person
experiencing them <Butler. 1968. p. 285).

George Santayana

says values are "indefinables" which are dependent upon our
interest in them.

John Stuart Mill defined moral good as

"the greatest happiness of the greatest number while
protecting the few"

<Butler. 1968. p.

286).

seems to favor a democratic value-system.
sanctions it. it is valuable or moral.
valuable.

This idea

If society

If not.

it is not
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Arguments:
The argument of choice for most realists would have to
be cause-effect because of its scientific nature and its
pre-eminence over free-will.

Butler (1968, p. 274) says.

"realists are more commonly on the side of necessity than on
that of freedom.

Most realists hold to some form of

determinism as a necessary alternative to the anything-canhappen kind of world which many of them feel is implied by
the idea of free will."

They feel

that

the free-will of the

individual is governed by the continual flow of causes and
effects in the universe.

Concerning the scientific nature

of cause-effect and realism Butler (1968. p. 274) says.
"realists are strong in their respect for the orderliness.
accuracy, and objectivity of science ...

though the world is

a pluralism the operation of causes and effects is essential
to its orderliness."
Circumstance, a sub-variety of cause-effect, would
most

likely be used by realists as their decisions are based

upon what

they see.

As Butler says. "realism is the

refinement of our common acceptance of the world as being
just what it appears to be" <1968, p. 270).

PRAGMATISM

Butler says that.

"pragmatism builds on the intuition

that experience is the proving ground in which the worth of
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things is made plain" (1968. p. 377).

Metaphysicss
The metaphysics of pragmatism is so grounded in
epistemology that it has been accused of having no
metaphysics <Butler. 1968. p. 382).

Butler outlines ten

propositions concerning pragmatism's relation to the
universe or reality (world).
1. "The world is all foreground."

The idea is that the

background of any situation is irrelevant to the
situation which is here and now.
2. "The world is characterized throughout by process and
change."
3. "The world is precarious."
4.

It is unpredictable.

"The world is incomplete and indeterminate."

I t

i s

still growing and may be changed by man even though man
is not self-determined.
5. "The world is pluralistic."
multiplicities.

It is not

The universe is one of
just a universe but a multi-

universe.
6. "The world has ends within its own process."

In short.

values are transitory experiences.
7.

"The world is not. nor does it include. a transempirical
reality." Atheism.

8.

"Man is continuous with the world."

Man is not separate

from nature.
9.

"Man is an active cause in the world."

Man. although he
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hasn't complete free will, can influence the direction of
events.
10. "The world does not guarantee progress."

Man must be

involved in the world if there is to be any progress
(Butler, 1968, pp.

382-388).

Epistemology:
Pragmatism is essentially an epistemological
philosophy dealing primarily with the method of knowledge.
Pragmatism's epistemological concern is basically "to make
things work and so to realize their present value"
1968, p.

377).

everything.

Experience is the frame of reference for

To the pragmatist nothing is "real" until it

enters the realm of sense or experience.
placed on scientific method, not
of facts

<Butler,

(Butler, 1968, pp.

Much emphasis is

just for the accumulation

380-382).

Axiologys
Pragmatism does not define value in any ultimate sense
(no absolutes).

Rather values exist in relation with

individual-social activities (Butler, 1968, pp.
The individual

394-395).

(self) "is both responsible and accountable

for what he does" in society.

A pragmatist considers which

values are desirable (both for self and the good of others)
and then strives for consistency in value selection.

Values

are adopted from the perspective of the present situation
which would determine the best way to resolve conflict
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<Butler, 1968, 396-397).

Arguments:
Like the realist the pragmatist would be more likely
to use cause-effect since pragmatism is interested in
practical reality.

Unlike idealism, this is a philosophy of

becoming, not being.

Weaver (1970, p.

214) asserts that

the metaphysical ground of cause-effect is that it operates
in the realm of becoming.

Also,

experience is everything.

Causes and effects are a natural

part of experience.

to the pragmatist,

As in realism and naturalism scientific

method is exalted which, as mentioned earlier, is compatible
with cause-effect reasoning.

Finally,

it was Weaver himself

who said, "I must note that it [cause-effect] is heard most
commonly from those who are characteristically pragmatic in
their way of thinking"

(1970, p. 214).
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CHAPTER TWO: USES OF ARGUMENT

Arguments Outlined
In this chapter each of the four types of argument used
by each of the four speakers will be identified.

The

arguments identified will be limited to the Weaverian
hierarchy, namely: definition, analogy, cause effect, and
testimony.

These arguments will produce the material needed

for the philosophical analysis in Chapter 3.

Definition
Below each speaker's use of definition will be recorded
and explained.

As Weaver

(1970, p. 209) has said, "One way

to interpret a subject is to define its nature--to describe
the fixed features of its being.

Definition is an attempt

to capture essence ... Definitions accordingly deal with
fundamental and unchanging properties."

Robert Dole- Use of definition
Senator Dole uses nine basic arguments from definition.
Some of them are repeated but are not counted more than once
in this analysis.

Another reader might see more or less.

For instance, my conception of argument by definition may be
different

#1

than another's.

Senator Dole's first use of definition starts in the
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second paragraph where he addresses the question of whether
the Gulf situation is worth human lives being lost.
states the implied question.

He

"How can you look someone in

the eye or the parents and say.

'This is worth it?'"

He

answers. "I guess that has always been the question in any
war."
What Senator Dole is saying is that concerning an
individual person one could not say. "It is worth the life
of your husband. wife.

son. daughter. etc."

However. from

an ideal standpoint. he implies that national peace.
security. and freedom are worth fighting and dying for.
He mentions the same later in the speech saying. "I
don't think the time will ever come that I can look a parent
in the eye and say.

'Well. I think it's fine:

I can justify

sending your son and risk his life anywhere in the world.'"
While admitting reluctance he does not admit that

there are

not some things worth fighting or dying for.

#2

He argues that military might is necessary for peace

and that war's consequences are necessary to change
behavior.

The former is a paradox-- peace through superior

strength--but nevertheless a universal truth in the minds of
most. Next Senator Dole says. "Sanctions. without a credible
military threat ... are not going to work for a long time."
He argues that Hussein would only act correctly in the face
of severe consequences.

"The best way to have peace is for

Saddam Hussein to clearly understand the consequences."
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#3

Senator Dole argues from definition when he holds up

peace as a universally desired state of humanity.

Although

he mentions peace many times, he refrains from clearly
defining it.

What he says instead are things like,

to pursue every avenue for a peaceful solution."
he says,

"If he wants peace he can have it."

"we need

Of Saddam

Of the

President he says the Congress should "strengthen his hand
for peace."

His idea of peace surely includes defense but

he, nevertheless, holds it up as an ideal.

#4

One of Senator Dole's strongest arguments from

definition includes the picture he draws of Saddam Hussein.
He scornfully mentions Saddam directly or indirectly thirtytwo times in his speech emphasizing that
Saddam's fault.

this crisis is

Dole characterizes him as the essence of

evil.
He says, "I have been a little astonished to hear some
on this floor criticize President Bush without ever
mentioning Saddam Hussein.
today.

Saddam Hussein can end this

He can end it tomorrow" or "the primary message

coming from the Congress today is to Saddam Hussein.

The

last time I checked, he was the real villain in this piece."
Dole repeatedly emphasizes that
responsibility and that

this crisis is Hussein's

it is up to him to end it or not.

This form of definition can be contrasted with Senator
Mitchell's speech which placed responsibility and blame on
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the President.

#5

Senator Dole uses argument from definition in reference

to the President of the United States.
Mr. President [of the Senate].

He says. "So I hope.

that we are going to

demonstrate today that the President of the United States is
the Commander-in-Chief."

In this passage he defines the

role of the President-- "Commander in Chief." This title
carries much weight and added meaning.

Senator Dole appeals

here to the Senate's loyalty and respect for authority
suggesting that if they do not authorize the President to
use force they are doing something that is not only
contentious but disloyal. disrespectful. and unpatriotic.
Many do not respect or fear the President. especially those
of the opposing political party. but Senator Dole defines
the President as one who. by nature of his office. deserves
the respect of his peers.

#6

Senator Dole used definition when he tried to shame his

colleagues for

their lack of a work ethic.

"I said last

November and December we ought to have been here debating
then. when the policy was being formulated.

instead of

coming in at the eleventh hour after having been AWOL for
three or four months ... "

Here he holds up the work ethic-

something that many believe made our nation what it is- as
an ideal and accuses his colleagues of not measuring up to
i t •
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#7

Definition is used when Dole appeals to the Senate's

sense of fair play.
America.

Fair play is something sacred in

We have a deep feeling that everyone should have

opportunity to do what

they want and that if they play by

the rules they are entitled to whatever they might gain.
When he says that the Senate should have been debating three
or four months ago instead going AWOL and now trying to
"change the direction of the policy President Bush has so
patiently and successfully put together" he was saying that
they were not being fair.
#8

One of his strongest uses of definition is when he

defined the nature of the conflict.
the United States versus Iraq.

He said, "This is not

It is the entire

international community with just a few exceptions versus
Saddam Hussein and Iraq."

He defines it this way to give us

a feeling of being right and to quell
senators who would be reluctant

the fears of any

to engage in any

international conflict.

#9

In his passionate call for unity Senator Dole again

argues from definition.

Responding to another speech he

says, "The Senator from Illinois £Paul Simon, Democrat]
indicated it [the vote]
That is unfortunate.
get consent."

just

is going to be closely divided.

I wish it were not, I wish we could

Unity is the universal here.

Without it
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United we stand, divided we fall.

He said a unified congress would, "strengthen the
President's hand for peace."

He finishes

this thought by

saying, "if he [Saddam] draws the same conclusion as the
Senator from Illinois has drawn,

that America is divided,

that Congress is divided, he may think he is going to get a
free ride; he is going to be rescued, maybe, by the
Congress."

George Mitchell: Use of Definition

Senator Mitchell (D, Maine) argues from definition
eight times throughout his speech.

The following paragraphs

outline each occurrence.

#1

Senator Mitchell uses definition when he pays homage to

the wisdom of our country's founding fathers and their
political masterpiece,

the Constitution.

He especially

praises the wisdom of their system of checks and balances.
He said,

"The writers of our Constitution succeeded by

creating a government with separate institutions and divided
powers.

They correctly reasoned that if power were

sufficiently dispersed, no institution or individual could
gain total power.

Nowhere has their concept been more

severely tested than in what they regarded as one of the
greatest powers of government -

the power to make war."

What he is doing is lifting up a strongly held belief, at
least in the U.S.,

that no one individual or group should
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possess unlimited power.

The three-fold division of power

[exectutive, legislative,

judicial] is sacrosanct in the

U.S.

#2

Mitchell's second use of definition comes when he seeks

to define George Bush in a negative light e.g., a
capricious, war-mongering president.

Senator Mitchell

mentions him directly or indirectly forty-seven times.
He explained how the president capriciously changed his
mind in favor of force when sanctions were beginning to take
effect.

He also accused the President of misusing his

authority or trying to usurp authority that he didn't
actually have.

He mentioned that only Congress has the

power to declare war and that
consent.
that,

He complained,

the President needed their

"But yesterday the President said

in his opinion, he needs no such authorization from

the Congress." Later in his speech he said, "The president
did not consult with Congress about
did it." and "In effect,

that decision ... he just

the President - overnight, with no

consultation and no public debate - changed American policy
from ...

sanctions ... into a predominantly American effort

relying upon the use of American military force."

I t

i s

easy to see that he is trying to establish George Bush as
the villain or problem.

#3

He is not nearly as hard on Saddam.

Mitchell uses argument from definition when he defines

the main question of the debate.

"In this debate, we should
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focus on the fundamental question before us: What is the
wisest course of action for our nation in the Persian Gulf?"
Whether this is the uncontested main question or not is
immaterial.

That he sought to clearly define the main

question is.

#4

When Mitchell says that "Iraq must fully and

unconditionally withdraw its forces from Kuwait" he is
defining the unanimous goal of Congress.

Since this is

believed by all involved to be the goal of the matter it
could be considered an ideal principle.

#5

Mitchell uses definition when he pleads for collective

effort on the part of all affected countries.
the fact

He bemoans

that this is largely a U.S. undertaking and

believes that other nations should share more of the burden.
He says,
value.

"Opposition to aggression is not solely an American
It is universal.

If there is to be war in the

Persian Gulf, it should not be a war in which Americans do
the fighting and dying while those who benefit from our
effort provide token help and urge us on."
Concerning sanctions he says, "By definition, sanctions
require many nations to participate and share the burden."
Mitchell feels it is inherently right

to share the burden

and use collective effort.

#6

Mitchell puts the highest premium on human life, saying
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that it is the greatest risk in this conflict.
"The risk is foremost in human life.
die? ... That's a risk. a terrible risk.

He says.

How many people will
Just this morning I

heard it said that there may be 'only' a few thousand
casualties.

But for the families of those few thousand -the

fathers and mothers. husbands and wives. daughters and sons
-the word 'only' will have no meaning.

And the truly

haunting question, which no one will ever be able to answer,
will be: Did they die unnecessarily?"
By saying this Mitchell holds up life as invaluable,
something sacred.

#7

This constitutes definition.

When we argue by definition we are hinting at essence

or something that is independently real or true.

Mitchell

hints at essence when he warns his fellow senators that
their vote will have serious consequences.
He states. "The essence of democracy is accountability
and if immediate war occurs,

that resolution. and those who

voted for it must share that accountability."

Others may

have a different idea about what the essence of democracy
i s.

That is not the issue.

The issue is that Senator

Mitchell believes and argues that being responsible for
one's actions. a vote in this case. is the essence of
democracy.

#8

In doing so he argues from definition.

One thing that the use of definition should do is clear

up uncertainties about an issue or the user's position on
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that issue.

Mitchell does this when referring to the

President's request for authorization for the use of
military force.
voting.

He wants everybody to know that

they are

in his opinion. on a resolution for "war" regardless

of the title.
He explains. "The President has submitted to the
Congress a written request for authorization to use military
force.

That is the title of the resolution.

In the current

circumstances clearly it would be of such a scope and
intensity that can only be described as war.

So the second

resolution is. plainly. by its own words and by the
circumstances which exist in the Persian Gulf. an
authorization for war.
dispute.

Of that there can be no doubt or

That is what we will be voting for. or against.

today."

Senator Danforths Use of Definition
Senator Danforth <R. Missouri) argues from definition
nine times throughout his speech.

The following paragraphs

outline each occurrence.

#1

Danforth said that throughout the debates two

convictions were foremost

in his mind.

he says. "I am convinced beyond a doubt

Concerning the first
that the United

States must not allow the status quo in Kuwait to stand."
This is more a moral belief than anything.

He believes that

Iraq is wrong for occupying Kuwait and that the U.S. as the
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remaining world power and ally of Kuwait should not allow
i t •

When someone comes out and says "This is wrong." they are
taking a moral stance,

#2

thus defining.

Danforth says, "My second conviction is that - war with

Iraq would be a disaster we should do everything to avoid.
I have believed and I do believe that

the negative

consequences of war far outweigh the positive."

Although

the war was over relatively quickly with only a few American
casualties, Danforth was stating his beliefs about
uncontrollable aspects of war.

the

He is defining war as a

match that has no winners.

#3

At one point Danforth says, "We must be prepared to

check terrifying aggression at all of its sources."
the other Senators he holds the strong belief that

Like
the

United States is a benign force in the world that has the
means, and therefore the responsibility,
injustices.

to remedy gross

He defines the Iraqi invasion as "terrifying

aggression" and holds it up as something that is
unacceptable in a civilized world. This defines his position
on the invasion and the response the U.S should make.

#4

Danforth paints a negative picture of Iraq.

Referring

to the oppressive former Soviet Union he comments that, "to
be rid of one threat does not make the world safe."

What he
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is doing here is attempting to capture the prevailing antiSoviet attitudes and to attach them now to Iraq. making Iraq
the new "Evil Empire."
He strengthens this argument by adding the threat of
yet another nuclear foe.

He says. "A growing list of

countries now possess or soon will possess the instruments
of mass destruction.

One of those countries is Iraq."

Not

only has he defined Iraq as the new "Evil Empire" but he has
painted them as our next possible nuclear foe.

One that is

a lot less predictable than the Soviet Union.

#5

Not only does Danforth define Iraq as a "brutal

aggressor" and a threat

<i . e .

to "the preservation of world order"

George Bush's "New World Order") but he also defines

them as a threat to our vital interests.

He says "what is

involved is ... the vital economic and security interests of
the United States and the rest of the world as well."

By

defining Iraq this way he seems to be subtly saying that the
coalition forces ought

to crush them now. not only for

invading Kuwait but because they are a future threat to
world's economic security.

#6

Just as Danforth paints a scornful picture of Iraq he

portrays the U.S as a benign world power.

He says. "Would

that there were more leaders from the free world. but
fact

is that the United States is the leader.

one remaining world power."

the

We are the
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After establishing the U.S. as the sole world power he
places a high and idealistic responsibility on it to lead
the fight

for world order.

He continues. "And if the United

States now retreats from its commitment for a joint effort
on the ground that others are not as strong or as firm as we
are. all the efforts to seek Security Council resolutions
and to consult with other governments will have been an
exercise of futility. recognized as such throughout the
world."

This argument by definition counters Mitchell's

definitive argument that unless there is collective effort
there should be no effort at all.

#7

The former Watergate offender G. Gordon Liddy wrote a

book which pays tribute to the inner qualities of resolution
and steadfastness.

The book is simply titled "Will."

In it

he holds up the human will as that which can overcome all
obstacles.

He sees the will as man's greatest gift.

I t

i s

an ideal quality. an absolute. an eternal truth.
Danforth appeals to the will of the Congress to stand
up against brutality.
abandon ship.

He argues. "The captain cannot

Having gained the approval of so many other

governments. some of which are on the very border of Iraq
and in great peril for

their survival.

it is unthinkable

that our Government would now lose its will."

He asks the

question that many have had to answer throughout history.
"Do we have the will to stop this?
standard against

this. who will?"

If we don't raise a
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#8

Every civilized person recognizes

optimal solution of any problem.

that war is not

the

While this sentiment

remains many recognize that it cannot always be avoided.
Even in the helter-skelter of war the civilized world
expects a certain restraint in conduct i.e .• civilians are
not unnecessarily harmed.

Is there an ideal war?

Danforth hints that although there is not
code of ethics even in war.

Senator

there is an ideal

Realizing that

the decision-

makers in Iraq can keep themselves insulated from the effect
of the sanctions he says. "Sanctions alone will cause
suffering to the civilian population of Iraq but
not force the Iraqi army from Kuwait.

they will

And causing suffering

to a civilian population without military results should
never be the objective of a civilized nation."

This is a

"should" proposition based on an ideal concerning war.

thus

definition.
#9

Danforth's ninth and final use of definition comes when

he states that.

"the key to peace is maintaining a credible

military threat." This is a statement of conservative
ideology.

It is like saying. "We need an armed police force

to protect our citizens" or "We need harsh laws against
drunk drivers to keep our streets safe."

On the other hand.

the liberal ideal is that we will never have peace until we
get rid of all our bombs.
Senator Danforth recognizes the apparent irony of what
he says and explains his position further:

"It is indeed a
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supreme irony that it is only through the threat of force
that a stable world can be maintained.

But that

we have recognized ever since World War II."
expressing an ideal concerning war and peace.

is an irony

Again. he is
In doing so

he is using definition.

Senator Nunn: Use of Definition
The speech by Senator Nunn CD. Georgia) contained only
six apparent arguments by definition.

the least of all

the

speeches.

#1 Nunn begins his speech by addressing how ironic it seemed
that

the foreign minister of Iraq refused to accept a letter

from President Bush because he didn't
polite.
and.

He said. "I find that

indeed. repulsive."

think it would be

Iraqi protest both ironic

What he found repulsive was that a

country that seems to care so little about

the laws of

civility and humanity could be so concerned about

the

niceties of etiquette.
He asks sarcastically. "Was it polite when Saddam
Hussein used chemical weapons against his own people?
then. again. against Iran?

And

Was it polite when Iraqi forces

launched a brutal. unprovoked invasion of Kuwait?

Was it

polite when Iraqi forces used savage violence against
innocent Kuwaiti civilians and took hostage innocent
foreigners residing in that country?"

He uses definition

here by showing the negative example of the Iraqis
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concerning civility.

Civility is the ideal.

Politeness was

an effective contrast.

#2

Nunn's second use of definition came when he sought to

clarify exactly what President Bush was asking for in his
request.

He wanted to make sure there was no question in

his colleague's minds as to what they will be voting on.

He

defined it as war, plain and simple.
He states, "There are many gray areas where the
Congress, by necessity, has permitted and even encouraged
and supported military action by the Commander-in-Chief
without specific authorization and without a declaration of
war.

I do not deem every military action taken as war.

think there is always room for debate on definitions.

I

But a

war against Iraq to liberate Kuwait initiated by the United
States and involving over 400,000 American forces is not a
gray area."

#3

Senator Nunn quotes the Constitution more than once.

When quoting it should be considered testimony but when he
lauds the wisdom behind it he uses definition.

He

understands that many see the wisdom of the Constitution as
an almost unchanging property or value.

That is why so many

Americans, especially politicians, refer to it.
He says, "It is essential,

to comply with the

Constitution and to commit the Nation,

that Congress give

its consent before the President initiates a large-scale
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military offensive against Iraq.

I think the Founding

Fathers had a great deal of wisdom when they put
provision in the Constitution."

this

He holds forth the wisdom

of the Founding Fathers for our age to respect and emulate.
This is a form of argument by definition.

#4

Nunn's fourth occurrence of argument by definition

comes when he again seeks to define a single concept.
time he goes after the word "vital."

This

Suggesting that his

fellow Congressmen should think before they call something
vital he says.

"When we talk about

the question of vital - a

lot oftimes we in Washington throw that word around as if
it's just another word."

To illustrate his point he refers

to the "vital" interests we had in Lebanon that we abandoned
once the marines were killed.
Nunn's definition of vital is different from just
merely something important.

He explains.

are important. very important.

"A lot of things

than aren't vital.

Vital in

the sense of young men and young women being called to put
their lives on the line."

Afterwards he places a

responsibility upon his colleagues to define the situation
properly.

He says. "We have an obligation as leaders to

distinguish between important interests which are worthy of
economic. political. and diplomatic efforts and interests
that are vital.

that are worth the calling by the leaders of

this Nation on our young men and women in uniform to
sacrifice.

if necessary.

their lives."
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#5

The theme that runs throughout Nunn's speech is that

war should be the last resort.
he can.

He defines war as harshly as

He repeatedly tells his colleagues of the ugliness

of war and the cost of it in human lives.

Quoting the

former Admiral Crowe to make his point he says. "War is not
neat. not tidy: once you resort to it. war is uncertain and
a mess."

Although he makes much of this argument

through

cause-effect he is using definition when he paints a picture
of war as the most undesirable of human endeavors.

#6

Finally Senator Nunn asks his colleagues to answer the

"fundamental question" of the conflict.

The question to him

is the ultimate question of the debate.

That is why he

closes with it.

By asking it he requires his colleagues not

only to tally the score and weigh all the pros and cons but
to be truthful with themselves and to search their souls.
He asks the Senators to ask themselves. "will I be able
to look at

the parents. wives.

the husbands. and children in

the eye and say their loved ones sacrificed their lives for
a cause vital to the United States. and that there was no
other reasonable alternative?" This is the ultimate question
in his mind.

By defining the ultimate question of value he

is arguing by definition.
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ANALOGY (SIMILITUDE)

The next

form of argument

analogy or similitude.

in Weaver's hierarchy is

He says,

"We make use of analogy or

comparison when the available knowledge of the subject
permits only probable proof.

Analogy is reasoning from

something we know to something we do not know in one step;
hence there is no universal ground for predication.
behind every analogy lurks
(definition)."

the possibility of a general

Later he says,

the moment be

Or, he may be using an indirect approach for

reason of tact;
generalizations;

analogies not

infrequently do lead to

and he may be employing this approach

because he is respectful of his audience and desires
use their

term

"The user of analogy is

hinting at an essence which cannot at
produced.

Yet

insight"

Analogy is,

them to

(1970, p.213).

then,

simply comparing one thing or event

to another in order to hint at

a greater reality or to

solidify a likeness or relationship.

The following sections

will outline the use of analogy by the four Senators.

Robert Dole: Use of Analogy
Senator Dole uses analogy well and uses it more than
any of the four Senators.

The eight

instances will be

identified in the following paragraphs.
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#1

A.

"Holiday" for Saddam

At the time of this speech the January 15 deadline had
been set for Iraq to leave Kuwait.

Dole argued that if the

President had not been given permission to use force the
deadline would mean nothing.

The resolution before them at

the time required that more time should be given to let
sanctions work.

the

Dole argues, "it (the pro-sanctions

resolution] actually gives Saddam Hussein a holiday from the
threat that we might use force,

if I tell you well, on

January 15 we are going to let sanctions work some
interminable length of time - not six months."

He added

that if Saddam were given this "holiday" he would use it to
dig in deeper and inflict more casualties upon our forces.
By comparing the pro-sanctions resolution to a "holiday," he
illustrates its weakness.

li

.::A two-edged sword"
The pro-sanctions resolution that he referred to as a

"holiday" for Saddam he also refers to as a "two-edged
sword."

He calls it a two-edged sword because while it may

negatively affect Iraq it will give them more time to dig in
making them more dangerous.

#3

It could backfire.

"A.W.O.L."
Chiding the Senate for trying to subvert the

President's policy at the last minute he charges, "I said
last November and December we ought to have been here
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debating then when the policy was being formulated instead
of coming in at

the eleventh hour after having been AWOL for

three or four months and try to change the direction of the
policy President Bush has so patiently and successfully put
together." The "A.W.O.L." (absent without

leave) analogy

denounces a partisan and lackadaisical Congress. comparing
them to a soldier who deserts his unit.

#4

Pulling the!..!!.&.. out!
Asking the Senate to back the President in order to

show solidarity he pleads. "Let us not pull the rug out from
under the President at

this last moment. at

the eleventh

hour. when the pressure is building on Saddam Hussein by the
minute." By using the rug analogy he suggests that a vote
against authorization is at best disloyal and at worst a
dirty trick.

li

A. "hunting license"
Although Dole wants to authorize the President's option

to use force he does not

intend it to be a ticket

to carry

out a personal vendetta.

He explains, "I want our President

to understand this is not

some hunting license.

that

this is

to strengthen his hand for peace. not war but for peace."

#6

::..A blank check"
Referring to the granting of authorization to use force
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he explains. "this is not a blank check" and adds,
to use my influence ...

in every way that

"I intend

I can to find some

peaceful way to resolve the current crisis."

As in the

"hunting license" illustration he is trying to assure his
fellow Senators that a vote for authorization does not mean
that President Bush will be able to act capriciously.

ll

:A

free ride"

Senator Dole suggests that a divided Congress will
signify to Saddam Hussein that we will not have enough
solidarity to thwart him.
would turn out

He. after all. was hoping this

to be another Viet Nam.

He says.

"if he

[Hussein] draws the same conclusion as the Senator from
Illinois [Paul Simon, Democrat] has drawn.
divided.

that America is

that Congress is divided. he may think he is going

to get a free ride."

This analogy is appropriate for

Congress since giving Saddam a "free ride" is the last
they want

#8

thing

to appear to be doing.

"An anchor"
Dole's last analogy is a play on words.

He states that

if Saddam thinks Congress is divided that maybe he will be
off the hook.

He says that maybe Saddam thinks that.

"he is

going to be rescued, maybe. by the Congressi we are going to
throw him an anchor.
go down."

But if we throw him one.

I want

it

to
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Senator Mitchella Use of analogy

Mitchell's initial

focus

in his

speech was

the balance

between the power of the President and Congress concerning
the power to go to war.
designates
Forces.
direct

says.

He

"The Constitution

the President as Commander-in-Chief of

With that designation comes

the authority to

the deployment of those forces.

Constitution also grants

the Armed

to the Congress

But

the

the authority to

raise and support armies and to declare war."
His point

is

that he believed that President Bush was

over-stepping his boundaries when he was posturing to use
force without consulting Congress.

#2

:A

blank check"

Mitchell. wanting to drive home how serious
resolution is. warned that

the

to give President Bush permission

to use force would be like giving him a "blank check"
initiate war.

He

says.

"In its

simplest

form.

to

the question

is whether Congress will give the President an unlimited
blank check to initiate war."

John C. Danfortha Use of Analogy

ll

A.. New Threat

Danforth recalls history and points out
Union is not now the threat

that

it once used to be.

the Soviet
Yet. he
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emphasizes.
place.

that does not necessarily make the world a safe

He says. "This is the first major test of the post-

cold-war order ... the great
is no longer real ... But

the events of August 2 have

demonstrated to all that
make the world safe."

threat we have feared since 1945

to be rid of one threat does not

He goes on to detail Iraq's arsenal

of mass destruction and urges the U.S. not

to let its guard

down because the Soviets are no longer a threat.

#2

"Oi 1" and "Oxygen"
Danforth compares oil to oxygen when defending oil as a

vital security interest.

He says.

whether this conflict is not

'just about' oil.

is like asking whether it is not
or not. our country.

"Some people have asked
To me.

just about oxygen.

that

Like it

together with the rest of the world.

is

utterly dependent on oil."

li

"The World's Policeman"
Danforth does not actually call the U.S.

policeman" but rather defends against

"the world's

that accusation.

He

uses this analogy to show how President Bush skillfully and
patiently put together a coalition of countries for
multilateral action.
He says.
argued that
world.

"many ... especially liberal commentators. have

the United States should not go it alone in the

We should not

take it upon ourselves to be the
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world's policeman ... We should address crises on a
multilateral basis."

He answers the accusation by detailing

how President Bush repeatedly went

to the U.N. Security

Council for approval. how James Baker had been all over the
world consulting. and how through these efforts the
President had garnered the support of more than twenty
nations.

#4

"The captain cannot abandon the ship"
This analogy comes in response to the argument set

forth by Senator Mitchell that

is unfair that

had to put forth more money and troops
have.

He says.

the U.S. has

than other nations

in effect. now that we are choosing

multilateral action over unilateral action the opposition is
still not happy because we have to put up higher stakes.
sarcastically asks if we shouldn't

they can't have it both ways.

The analogy reads.
ship.

just scuttle the whole

He chides the opposition telling

idea of multilateralism.
them that

He

"The captain cannot abandon the

Having gained the approval of so many other

governments.

some of which are on the very border of Iraq

and in great peril for

their survival.

it is unthinkable

that our Government would now lose its will."

Sam Nunn1 Use of Analogy

!1.

1..§_ brutality polite?

Although Senator Nunn's "politeness" contrast is found
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in the definition section it is also fitting to call it an
analogy.

In this case it is a sarcastic analogy.

He

marveled at the Iraqi Ambassador's refusal to accept
President Bush's letter to Saddam on the grounds that it
probably would not be "polite."

He asked whether the

ambassador thought it was polite when Saddam used chemical
weapons against Iran or his own people, whether it was
polite when he invaded Kuwait, committed savage acts of
violence against its people, and took foreigners hostage?

#2

Lebanon s.!..

a

vital interest

In the definition section I outlined how Nunn
painstakingly defined the word "vital."

In that same breath

he used an analogy to point out that Kuwait is not really
vital to U.S.

interests.

He said, "I recall very clearly

President Reagan's 1982 declaration that Lebanon was vital
to the security of the United States.

Shortly thereafter,

following the tragic death of more than 200 marines, we
pulled out of Lebanon, we pulled out of a country that not
only a few weeks before had been declared vital."

Nunn disagreed with the Bush Administration's
interpretation of the CIA report on the Iraq situation.
White House jumped on the fact

The

that the CIA could not

guarantee that sanctions would indeed drive Iraq out of
Kuwait.

Nunn countered, "I haven't seen any guarantees on
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any subject
fault.

from the Intelligence Community.

They're not

CIA is not

It's not

in the business of guaranteeing.

the FDIC.

They give you the facts,

their
The

then you use

common sense to come to conclusions."

#4

Fast

food or Vietnam

While discussing the possibilities of a confrontation
Nunn seems sure that

it would not be another Vietnam nor

should we use the same politically motivated strategy which
proved so devastating to our forces.
to expect results
'over learn'
results.
victories.

too quickly.

the Vietnam lesson.

We want

fast

He warns however not

He says,

"we should not

We in America like instant

food and we want

fast military

However, our Nation places a much higher value

on human life ... we must

avoid an 'instant victory'

kind of

psychology with demands and expectations in this country
that could cause a premature and high casualty assault on
heavily fortified Kuwait by American ground forces."
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CAUSE/EFFECT

Weaver

(1971)

is to place it

says.

"another way to interpret a subject

in a cause-and-effect relationship.

process of interpretation is
of some effect or as

then to affirm it as

the effect of some cause.

The
the cause

And the

attitudes of those who are listening will be affected
according

to whether or not

effect analysis"

(p.

209).

they agree with our cause-andThe reason cause/effect

reasoning is ranked lower on Weaver's hierarchy is
of a philosophical basis.

its

lack

However. cause/effect reasoning

is a vital part of any issue.

The point

is

that overuse of

cause/effect demonstrates a lack of philosophical depth.
Although no Senator used more than six distinct
cause\effect arguments it
many of these arguments

should be noted that

several

they repeat

times during their speeches.

Robert Doles Cause/effect reasoning
#1

Senator Dole states at

the beginning of his

that.

"Sanctions. without

view.

are not going to work for a long time."

thesis of his

speech

a credible military threat.
is

the

speech and the crux of the whole debate.

It

is repeated throughout

the whole speech.

This

in my

Lack of support

for use of force by Congress would cause an effect of
strengthening Iraq's position.

Gulf War Debates
75

#2
for

Dole said he had heard that
the Senate vote" and that

"Saddam Hussein was waiting

a vote against

force would

indicate that he would get "a little holiday."

The cause

being a no-force vote,

the effect, more time for Saddam to

fortify his position.

Speaking of the Nunn resolution (no-

force) he says,
are about

"I happen to believe that

the resolution we

to vote on does exactly the wrong thing.

As I

have indicated,

it actually gives Saddam Hussein a holiday

from the threat

that we might use force."

the effect,
holiday;

"He (Saddam) probably would not

He later outlines
just

take the

he would probably dig in deeper and make

preparations so he could inflict even more casualties on the
United States and on our young men ... "

#3

When Dole says,

"I hope ...

demonstrate today that

that we are going to

the President of the United States is

the Commander-in-Chief." he is saying that a vote for
will

send a message to Iraq that our President

spokesman and that he has

is

force

indeed our

the authority to back up what he

says.

#4

The Senator offers up the essence of the whole

cause/effect question when he says,
us can predict with certainty,

"I am not certain any of

if there should be a

conflict, how many lives would be lost, how much of a cost,
how long it would last."

He then states his belief that
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"our best chance for peace is

to strengthen the President's

had in every way that we can."

A vote for

force would be

the cause and peace would be the probable result as
contradictory as

that may seem.

George Mitchell: Cause/effect
#1

Senator Mitchell

starts by giving a description of the

checks and balances built
concerning the power

into our system especially

to make war.

Then he states

that "the

question is whether Congress will give the President an
unlimited blank check to initiate war against
cause here would be a pro-force vote.

Iraq."

The

The implied result

would be placing a dangerous amount of power in the hands of
one man.

#2

Mitchell points out yet another cause/effect

concerning fairness.

He states,

sequence

"Americans now make up more

than three-fourths of the fighting

forces

in the region,"

and asks "Why should it be an American war, made up largely
of American troops, American casualties,
deaths?" The cause here is America's

and American

leadership role in the

fight creating the effect of a disproportionate amount of
American deaths.

#3

One of the most

lengthy portions of the Senator's

speech was where he argued, quoting the Bush Administration,
the CIA, etc.,

that

sanctions

(the cause) were working and
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putting an unbearable burden on Iraq (the effect).
mentioned the virtual cut-off of Iraqi exports.
in their GNP,
reserves,

the decline

their industry (esp. military hardware), oil

food reserves,

cause/effect

He

agricultural production, etc.

This

sequence covers over a full page of text making

it one of his major arguments.

#4

Mitchell does briefly mention the risks of using only

continued sanctions.
wide sanctions

The time needed for continued world-

(cause) may prove to be the undoing of the

international coalition (effect).
risk he reiterates
potential

#5

that

the risk of war

loss of American lives

He states

While acknowledging

this

(cause) and the

(effect)

is greater.

that war would cause "a greatly disrupted

oil-supply and oil price increases."

#6

He argued that a war that

other allies would result

included Israel, Turkey or

in long-term American occupation,

less stability in the Middle-East,

and Arab enmity against

the U.S.

John Danforth1
#1

Cause/effect

Senator Danforth's first cause/effect

in the issue of world peace.
2 have demonstrated to all
not make the world safe.

He said.

that

sequence brought

"The events of August

to be rid of one threat does

A growing list of countries now
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possess or soon will possess
destruction.
being that
threat

#2

the instruments of mass

One of those countries is

Iraq."

The idea

inaction on the part of the U.S. may result

in a

to world peace.

Danforth was concerned that

Iraq, which now has

approximately 20$ of the world's oil reserves, could gain
another 25$ by conquest of Saudi Arabia if our force was not
In other words a no-force vote

used.

(cause) could mean

that a mad-man would control nearly half the world's oil
reserves.

He argued that we are utterly dependent on oil

whether we like it or not

and Saddam could have huge impact

on our economy.

#3

Danforth was concerned about

the future of

international cooperative efforts.

He said,

States now retreats from its commitment
on the ground that others are not as
are,

all

the efforts

"if the United

for a joint effort

strong or as firm as we

to seek Security Council resolutions

and to consult with other governments will have been an
exercise of futility,
world."

recognized as

In other words,

if the U.S.

such throughout

the

backs out because the

other allied nations cannot provide as much force

(cause)

the future of international cooperation in matters such as
these is

#4

in jeopardy (effect).

Danforth took time to recognize the negative effects of
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war with Iraq.
the most

He named Middle-East

severe consequences.

instability as one of

However, he decides,

"Sanctions alone will cause suffering to the civilian
population of Iraq but

they will not

force the Iraqi Army

from Kuwait."

#5

Danforth did not

feel

that

time was on our side.

He

questioned whether troops could maintain high levels of
readiness
months,

if kept

in the desert

for another nine or so

the support of the American public, or

acceptance of their presence.
readiness,

support

from home,

Time is

the Muslim

the cause,

lack of

and Muslim resentment are the

implied effects.

Sam Nunna Cause/effect reasoning
#1

Senator Nunn felt

effective.

that

sanctions could be very

He noted how the Iraqi economy is based on oil

which accounts

for nearly 50% of its GNP and nearly 100% of

its hard currency.

Cut off oil

(cause)

and disable their

economy (effect).

#2

Nunn quoted Admiral Crowe as saying that war is an

uncertain mess and added that,

"the additional cost

Kuwait of letting sanctions work must
cost

to Kuwait

to

be weighed against

in terms of human lives, human suffering,

well as national resources,

the
as

if the U.S.-led coalition

launches a military offensive to liberate a country which is
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heavily fortified."

In his mind sanctions (cause) and their

risks (effect) are better than a military strike (cause) and
its risks both to Kuwait and the U.S.
#3

forces.

Another effect of war with Iraq is Mid-East

instability.

Nunn says, "Considering the wave of Islamic

reaction, anti-Americanism and terrorism that is likely to
be unleashed by a highly destructive war with many Arab
casualties, it is difficult

to conceive of the Middle East

as a more stable region where Americans will be safe."

#4

Finally Nunn considers the possibility of a vote for

force and an ensuing battle.
long war like Vietnam.

He didn't

However he warned of the possible

effects of a "quick victory mentality"
in lives.

think it would be a

(cause) and the cost
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TESTIMONY

Testimony is
one's
210)

simply the citation of a

self, usually an expert.
says,

"If we are not

As Weaver

source other
(1970,

pp.

than

209-

in position to see or examine,

can procure the deposition of someone who is,

but

the deposition

may become the substance of our argument."

Bob Doles Use of testimony

* Senator Dole did not use testimony in his speech *

George Mitchell1 Use of testimony
#1

Senator Mitchell cited one of the earliest drafts of

the Constitution to expound on exactly who's
declare war.

job it was

He said "The earliest draft of the

Constitution would have empowered the Congress
war,'

#2

a greater grant of power

than to

demonstrate that

'make

'declare war.'"

the sanctions were indeed working.

example is when George Bush said,
Iraq is

feeling

tiny fraction of goods

the heat ... Iraq's

get

to

One

" ... these sanctions are

cut off from world trade, unable to sell
a

to

On several occasions Mitchell quoted the President

working.

to

through."

leaders ... are

their oil,

and only
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#3

He quotes Secretary of State Baker as saying,

" ... we

must exercise patience as the grip of sanctions tightens
with increasing severity."

#4

He quotes CIA Director William Webster as saying,

" ... all sectors of the Iraqi economy are feeling

the pinch

of sanctions, and many industries have largely shut down."
Later he lists the effects Webster said that

the sanctions

were having on Iraq.

John Danforth: Use of Testimony
#1

Senator Danforth leaned heavily on the testimony of CIA

Director William Webster.
transcript of Webster's
Congressional Record.
portions of it

In fact he asked that a

testimony be printed in the
After the initial testimony he cited

three different

times to make the point

that

sanctions alone would not be enough.

Sam Nunn: Use of Testiaony
#1

Senator Nunn cites Article 1, Section 8 of the

Constitution to demonstrate that it is Congress, not
president who has the power to commit

#2

Nunn did not

the

the nation to war.

think that Kuwait was "vital" to our

national security and uses Ronald Reagan's words to
demonstrate how Lebanon was "vital" before the 200 marines
were killed and not so vital afterward.

He noted that it
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was a contradiction to call

it vital one day and pull out

shortly thereafter.

#3

He cites former Secretary of Defense and former CIA

Director James Schlesinger as

saying,

" ... the investment of

the prestige of the President of the United States now makes
it vital

(he does not use the word

to withdraw from Kuwait.
necessary,
I

I do not

lightly) for

think that

to achieve that objective,

for us

it

Iraq

is

to turn to war.

think that we can avoid war and still achieve the

objective of Iraqi withdrawal

#4

'vital'

from Kuwait."

In defense of continued sanctions he quotes President

Bush as

saying,

"Economic sanctions,

in this instance,

if

fully enforced, can be very, very effective ... and nobody can
stand up forever

#5

Again,

to total economic deprivation."

in defense of sanctions he quotes Dr. Gary

Hufbauer, Georgetown specialist on economic sanctions,
saying,

"Never have they (sanctions)

as

imposed such enormous

costs on the target country ... Iraq's economy ... is far more
vulnerable to economic coercion than other economies ... "

#6

Concerning the stability of the international coalition

he quotes Admiral William Crowe as saying,

"It

is hard to

understand why some consider our international alliance
strong enough to conduct

intense hostilities, but

too
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fragile

to hold together while we attempt a peaceful

solution."

#7

He again quotes Admiral Crowe.

tidy; once you resort

#8

"War is not neat. not

to it. war is uncertain and a mess."

He claimed that CIA Director Webster's

confirmed that

if the sanctions were kept

to twelve months

testimony

in place for

six

Iraq's air and ground defenses would be

seriously degraded.

#9
times

Finally he quotes General Norman Schwarzkopf three
to demonstrate that continued sanctions are a better

alternative than force.
alternative to dying is
summer.

Schwarzkopf said.
sitting out

"If the

in the sun for another

then that's not a bad alternative."

SUMMARY

The number and types of arguments each Senator used has
now been detailed.

Chapter three will consist of a

philosophical analysis of the arguments.
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS

& CONCLUSIONS

While Chapter 2 detailed each speaker's use of the four
types of argument
argument

this chapter will analyze their use of

to identify their philosophical inclination.

Each

speaker will be analyzed according to their use of
definition, analogy, and cause-effect which are easily
ranked in Weaver's hierarchy.

Testimony can produce the

best or worst of arguments depending upon who is cited
(Weaver, 1970, p.209).

Therefore, arguments from testimony

will be analyzed qualitatively even though their totals
appear on the table.

RESULTS

--------~DEFINITION ____~ANALOGY ____CAUSE-EFFECT ____TESTIMONY

DOLE _ _ _ _ __ 9

8

4

0

MITCHELL _____

8

2

6

4

DANFORTH ______ 9

4

5

1

NUNN _ _ _ _ __ 6

4

4

9

figure No.

1
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As

shown Senators Dole and Danforth led in argument by

definition with 9, Mitchell had 8, and Nunn had 6.

Dole led

in use of analogy with 8 arguments, while Danforth and Nunn
had 4,

and Mitchell had 2.

Mitchell

led in the use of

cause/effect argument with 6 while Danforth used 5,
and Nunn used 4 each.

and Dole

In use of testimony Senator Nunn

cited 9 sources, Mitchell 4, Danforth 1, and Dole 0.
It was established in the methodology section that
Weaver placed the highest value on argument by definition
because it
perfect

seeks

to offer unchanging essences which is more

than that which has

to change.

He says,

"Stipulative definitions are of the ideal, and in this fact
lies

the reason for placing them at

hierarchy.
of ideal

the top of the

If the real progress of man is

truth,

it follows

that

toward knowledge

this is an appeal

to his

highest capacity--his capacity to apprehend what exists
absolutely"

(1970, p.213).

Since Senators Dole and Danforth led in this category
with 9 arguments

from definition apiece,

considered the most

they must be

idealistic in their philosophical

inclination and thus rate very high on Weaver's hierarchy.
Senator Mitchell also ranked high in this category with
8 and Senator Nunn was

the least

idealistic of all with 6.

The pro-forces senators had a combined total of 18
uses of definition while the anti-force senators usage
totaled 14.

This may indicate that by the use of definition
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alone Weaver himself may have taken the pro-force side.

ANALOGY
Next on Weaver's hierarchy is analogy (similitude)
because "behind every analogy lurks the possibility of a
general term"

(Weaver. 1970. p.

213).

He feels that the

user of analogy is hinting at an essence which is not
readily available.

This is closer to the ideal.

However.

analogies referring to nature can be considered
naturalistic.
Dole used 8 analogies. which is twice as many as the
next closest senator.

two of which could be considered

naturalistic analogies.

Senators Nunn and Danforth both

offered a modest use of analogy with 4.
natural analogy.
whole speech.

Danforth used 1

Mitchell used only 2 analogies in his

Considering only use of analogy Dole would

rate the highest by Weaver's standards and the pro-force
speakers <Dole and Danforth) with their combined total of
12 analogies would rate significantly higher than the antiforce speakers (Nunn and Mitchell) who had 6.

This

indicates that Dole is more idealistic than either Danforth
or Nunn and that Mitchell is the least idealistic of all.

CAUSE-EFFECT
Weaver found cause-effect argumentation to be used
mostly by those of a pragmatic nature.

He disdained
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argument exclusively based on consequence without reference
to principle or defined ideas.

He felt

that

this argument

tends to be sensational and is used to play upon the fears
of an audience (Weaver, 1970, p.

214-215).

Cause-effect

thus ranks lower than all arguments except extremely poor
use of testimony.
Senator Mitchell

led in his use of cause-effect

argument with 6, making him the most realistic/pragmatic
while Danforth had 5 and Dole and Nunn 4.

The pro-force

speakers and anti-force speakers were almost even in their
combined use of cause-effect argument
force 10).

(pro-force 9, anti-

Mitchell and Nunn were the only ones to mention

natural resources and the effects war could have on them.
However, each only mention it once.

TESTIMONY
Although testimony was listed last,
necessarily the weakest argument.
comes from its source.

it is not

The strength of testimony

"The sound maxim is that an argument

based on authority is as good as the authority" (Weaver,
1970, p.

216).

Senator Nunn was the undisputed leader in use of
testimony with 9.

The next closest was Mitchell with 4.

Danforth had 1 and Dole had 0.

In the methodology section I

identified idealists, realists, and pragmatists as being the
chief users of testimony.

Idealists use it only when it is

spiritual, authoritative, or historical.

Realists and
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pragmatists use it when they have a field expert available.
While Dole did not use testimony the other three Senators
leaned toward realism-pragmatism.

There were only two uses

of testimony of an idealistic nature. both Nunn and Mitchell
cited the Constitution once.

There were no citations of a

naturalistic kind. and the rest were from the president.
Secretary of State. the CIA director. and other experts and
authorities on war.

However,

the lack of testimony in the

pro-force speakers might suggest a naturalist tendency.
Naturalists believe that value is inherent in nature and
reject prescribed values. and thus would have little use of
the testimony of man or other revered sources.

PHILOSOPHICAL INCLINATION

Senator Dole
In view of Senator Dole's 9 to 4 ratio of definition
to cause-effect and his 8 to 4 ratio of analogy to
cause/effect it is safe to say that he has an idealistic
philosophical inclination.

Since he used 4 sequences of

cause/effect reasoning he still is somewhat pragmatic and
realistic yet not as much as the other senators.

Again, his

lack of testimony may suggest a touch of naturalistic
tendency.

Senator Mitchell
Mitchell's ratio of definition to cause-effect was 4
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to 3 while his analogy to cause-effect ratio was only 1 to
3.

While he was more idealist that anything he could be

considered less idealistic than the pro-force senators.

His

heavy use of cause-effect argumentation coupled with his use
of testimony which consisted largely of quoting contemporary
political figures signifies strong leanings toward realism
and pragmatism.

His use of testimony consists of quoting

the Constitution and the President as well as citing the
Secretary of State and CIA Director William Webster.
first

The

two uses could be considered idealistic, the next two

could be considered realistic/pragmatic so there is no
strong leaning to one or the other.

Senator Danforth
Senator Danforth's 9 to 5 definition to cause-effect
ratio shows him to be nearly as skewed toward idealism as
Dole but his analogy to cause-effect ratio is considerably
weaker (4 to 5).

He used one naturalistic analogy when he

spoke of "oil" and "water" but not enough to qualify him as
naturalistic.

However, his lack of argument from testimony

may also point

toward naturalism.

His use of cause-effect

arguments showed that he also had inclinations toward
pragmatism and realism.
than Mitchell.

More than Nunn and Dole yet

less

His one use of testimony came when he asked

that the letter submitted to the intelligence committee from
CIA Director William Webster be included in the record of
his speech.

The letter

was purely cause-effect
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observation.

Senator Nunn
Senator Nunn was the least idealistic of all yet his
definition to cause-effect ratio was 3 to 2 and his analogy
to cause-effect ratio was 1 to 1.
than anything else yet not by much.

He was more idealistic
He showed no sign of

being naturalistic in his use of analogy or testimony but
did show signs of realism/pragmatism when he mentioned that
he would fully back a pro-force vote should the pro-force
side prevail.
He,

Realism tends toward a democratic morality.

like the rest, also has some leanings toward pragmatism.

Although he used less cause/effect arguments than Mitchell
and Danforth his cause/effect ratio to both definition and
analogy is greater.

He used much more testimony than any of

the other speakers.

He,

like Mitchell, cited the

Constitution once but mostly relied on contemporary war
experts and political figures.

Nothing that would make him

seem more idealistic.

Weaverian Scales
Applying a value of 3 points to each use of
definition, 2 for analogy, and 1 for cause-effect produces
the following results.

Dole scored highest by Weaverian

standards with 47, Danforth next with 40,
34, and Nunn with 30.

then Mitchell with

Pro-forces Senators combined had 87
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compared to 64 for pro-sanctions.

CONCLUSION

As stated in the hypothesis Richard Weaver's hierarchy
of argument does indeed provide a useful framework for the
identification of arguments.

It was also hypothesized that

the arguments would prove useful in identifying the
speakers' philosophical inclinations.

In a purely

quantitative sense this cannot be proven, however,
was a qualitative endeavor.

this

The results show that each

speaker employed a few of each of the selected types of
arguments.

Their use of argument helped identify their

leanings toward idealism, pragmatism, and realism but little
pointed toward naturalism.

It was admittedly difficult to

identify a particular cause-effect argument as pragmatic,
realistic, or naturalistic.

Any further research along

these lines would be best served by reducing or simplifying
the range of philosophical starting points.

It would be

easier to identify a speaker as either idealistic or
pragmatic rather than to try to identify them as
naturalistic or realistic at the same time.
All speakers used a mixture of arguments, however it
may be significant that the pro-force senators used more
definition than the pro-sanctions senators (18-14).
also used more analogy (10-6).

They

Cause-effect usage was
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nearly equal

(pro-force 9, pro-sanctions 10).

The pro-

sanctions senators used significantly more testimony than
the pro-force senators

(13-1).

This could mean that

pro-sanction senators were better researched or
depend more upon external sources for

that

the
they

their information.

Some areas of research that can follow from this study
might be a language study of the Persian Gulf Debates or a
study of war rhetoric.

Further study concerning

philosophical inclination as it relates

to use of argument

should seek to reduce the variables of philosophy.
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APPENDIX

The Persian Gulf Crisis
By ROBERT DOLE, U.S. Senator from Kansas

M

Delivered to the Senate, Washington, D.C., January 12, 1991

R. President, we are going to be voting here in just

a few minutes. I want to say, first, I think it is an
honor and privilege for me to follow the distinguished Senator from Hawaii in this debate. He talked about
his generation, and I am part of that generation. In fact, the
two of us spent about 3 years together in Battle Creek, Ml, in
Percy Jones Hospital He was one of the greatest patients of
all time, as I recall.
Also there as a paticntwas our late distinguished friend, former
Senator Phil Hart. So I guess when you ask the question how can
~u look someone in the eye or the parents and sa~ "This is worth
11," I guess that has always been a question in any war.
To some of us, we see it differently. San_ctions, without a
credible military threat, in my.view, arc.not going_to_work for
a_Iong time. But it also seems to some of us that the best way
to have peace is for Saddam Hussein to clearly understand the
consequences.
Someone sent me a note yesterday saying that they had it on
very credible authority that Saddam Hussein was waiting for
the_ ~ena~c vote. He still had some hope that he would prevail,
not that anybody wants hi_mt6 prevail, but that the outcome
":ould mean to him he was going to have a Iittle holiday. Nobody
knows how long the holiday would be because there is not any
deadline in the Nunn holiday resolution. It is not 1day,3 days,
·
3 months, 3 vears.
I think ev;ryone would agree that Si!nctions without a credible military threat would never have any severe impact on Iraq
or Saddam Hussein.
.

I have said to the President of the United States in a meeting with Republicans and Democrats that we need to pursue
every avenue for peaceful solution •.
I have said to the President of the United States, when I
look into the eyes of a young man in the desert in Saudi Arabia
I see his parents, maybe his children, his spouse, and if we talk
about burden sharing as we have in the dollar terms, when do
we start counting the deaths; how many Egyptians? How many
Americans?- How many Saudis? How many British? This is the
real burden sharing.
\I have implored the President, who also has been there in
World War II, that what we are attempting to do in the Congress of the United States is to strengthen his hand for peace,
not to give him a license to see how fast we can become
engaged in armed confiict. As far as this Senator knows, there
is nothing in the U.N. resolution that says on January 15 you
have to do something. But I think on January 15 Saddam
Hussein will understand that if he wants peace, he can have
it.
Mr. President, I know that everyone in this Chamber wants
Saddam Hussein to get out of Kuwait, and some have additional demands they would make on Saddam Hussein.
I happen to believe that the resolution we are about to vote
on docs exactly the wrong thing. As I have indicated, it actually
gives Saddam Hussein a holiday from the threat that we might
use force, if I tell you, well, on January 15 we are going to let
sanctions work some interminable length of time - not 6
months.
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There is nothing about 6 months. The distinguished Pres- votes cast by the Senator from West Virginia, this being the
ident pro tcmporc indicated 6 months which might be a rea- most difficult.
sonable time. Maybe 1 month is a reasonable time.
I do not have quite that many, but this is a very difficult vote
We have all had our experiences with sanctions in other and when I vote no I want Saddam Hussein to understand tha;
parts of the world, generally without any military threat at all. I want peace, and I want him to understand that we arc pre.
It would seem to me that the pending resolution wipes out this paring our President, as we will on the next vote, to use force
credible threat unless we arc going to maintain 400,000 men if necessary. I want our President to understand this is not
there and all the military threat we have up unul some day in some hunting license, that this is to strengthen his hand for
the future, maybe this year or next year or the next year.
peace, not war but for peace. That is the message I believe will
I have always thought if you had sort of a holiday, as Saddam result after all the voting is done this afternoon.
Hussein would have, he probably would not just take the holMr. President, I thank the Chair.
iday; he would probably dig in_dceper and make preparations
President, .,;..c are not going to change any minds.
so he could Inflict even more casualties on the United States
and on our young men ·and other forces from other allied
I think everybody's mind has been made up. But I.
nations in this period. So it is a two-edged sword.
think in addition to a lot of hopes, there is a real
It seems to me we have to think about the ultimate result. world out there. I am not certain any of us can predict with
Do we save lives by waiting 6 months, or waiting a year, or do certainty, if there should_~.!! cpnfiict, how many lives would
we by our votes today jrtdicate to Saddam Hussein ~now_. it i~ be lost, how much of a cost, how long it would last.·· ··
up to you?"
•
.
I do believe that our best c;.hance for peace and best hope for
President Bush· did not start this war. I must say f h~ve bccrr. p.caac; is to str~ngthe.n !h_~_ Pre~ident's hand in every way that
a little astonished to hear some on this floor criticize President · we i:an. · · - ·
Bush without ever mentioning Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hus- \-The Senatorfrom Ill~oisjust indicated it is going to be closely
scin can end this today. He can end it tomorrow. ·
divided. Thai: is unfortunate. I wish it were not, I wish we could
So I want to vote for peace. I would like to have it both ways. get consent, after the vote, to do it on a voice vote that every·
This Senator would like to figure out how I could. tell this body would support. I said I would not ask for that consent.
group one thing and this group something else, but I have not
I am not so concerned about the message we send to the
been able to figure that out. Maybe some have.
White House. I am more concerned about the message we
But sooner or later there is going to be a moment of truth. send to Saddam Hussein. Somehow he has been forgotten in
I do not think the time will ever come that I could look some this debate. He started it. He can end it right now.
parent in the eye and say, "Well, I think it is fine; I can justify
I agree with the majority leader that there is not one Sen·
sending your son and risk his life anywhere in the world." ator in this body who wants war, not one on either side of the
Maybe such an occasion might arise.
aisle who wants war. I assume, by the same token, there is not
So I hope, Mr. President, that we arc going to demonstrate one who does not want peace and a peaceful settlement.
today that the President of the United States is the ComSome have strong convictions following one path and some
mander in Chief.
have strong convictions on another path, but I think the bottom
The Congress of the United States certainly has a role to play. line is that this is not a blank check, as far as this Senator is
I said last November and December we ought to have been here concerned. I intend to use my influence, if any, in every way that
debating then when the policy was being formulated instead of I can to find some peaceful way to resolve the current crisis.
coming in at the 11th hour after having been AWOL for 3 or 4
It just seems to me that when we authorize, we do not man·
months and try to change the direction of the policy President date. We do not say that it has to be today, tomorrow, or next
Bush has so patiently and successfully put together.
week. We authorize. I believe President Bush understands that
This is not the United States versus Iraq. It is the entire it is an authorization. It is only an authorization.
international community with just a few exceptions versus
After we vote, there will be a vote in the House on this same
Saddam Hussein and Iraq.
resolution. It is going to be a massive vote of support for Pres·
Let us not pull the rug out from under the President at this ident Bush, true bipartisanship in the House of Representa·
last moment, at the 11th hour, when the pressure is building o'n tives, and I commend them for that.
Saddam Hussein by the minute. Let us not give him any relief
I commend my colleagues on the other side who will supby our votes in the Congress. port this resolution. I would encourage those who may have
- I do not question anybody's motives, anybody's patriotism. voted for the. Nunn-Mitchell resolution to support this resoWe all have the same objective. We all have the same goals. We lution. It is not contradictory. It demonstrates again that the
all want to send a signal. But I think you should ask any neutral primary message coming from the Congress today is to .sa~·
observer what would happen if somebody imposed a deadline, dam Hussein. The last time I checked, he was the real villain
told me I had until a certain time to do something, and some- in this piece_
body else said, "Well, we arc going to give you another period
Mr. President, for many reasons, this is a very important
of time, nobody is going to say how long, but don't worry about vote. It is a very important time in history. The Senator fro!D
the deadline because we are going to let sanctions work in the Connecticut pointed out that things in the Mideast arc always
next month, or 2 months, or 6 months, or 12 months, or 2 years, difliculL
or 3 years, or 10 years."
_But if WC postpone it for 6 weeks or 6 months or 1 year. iS
I think we know where the votes are. If we do not, we ought it going to be any less difficult? If we have a conflict at that
to get some new counters. Nobody is going to be swayed by tilne; Will there be fewer casualties, or more? Will the st~CS
what anyone says here. But I think it is important that we state be higher or lower?
our views. The Senator from West Virginia talked of 20,000
It seems to me that if we could encourage more of our

MR.
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colleagues - and I know that everyone has the same
There is not much time left, and to President Bush I say, as
goal. and that is for Saddam Hussein to get out of Kuwait. I said earlier, this is to strengthen your hand; this is to give you
· But if he draws the same conclusion as the Senator from every resource we can in the final 48 or 72 hours to send the
Illinois has drawn.that America-is divided. that Corigres5 message that we want a peaceful settlement.
is. divide~, he. ·may think he is going to get a free ride; he is
And to Saddam Hussein. again, to underscore that some
goiitg to be rescued. maybe, by the Congress; we are going to message, plus to send him an additional message that Conwow him an anchor. But if we throw him one, I want it to go gress has acted. We have had bipartisan debate, and we have
had some partisan debate. But we are going to have a bipardown.
Mr. President, I would hope my colleagues would support tisan result in the House of Representatives and the U.S.
this resolution, the resolution offered by the distinguished Senate.
Senator from Virginia (Mr. Warner], the distinguished Sena·
So for all of us who want peace; for all of us who want to
tor from Connecticut [Mr. Lieberman], and others of us on strengthen the President of the United States, along with 82
both sides of the aisle. This is the time. Oh, there will be other percent of the American people, the vote on this resolution
times, but this is the time to send the message. There is not should be yes.
much time left.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
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By GEORGE J. MITCHELL, U~'itid States Senator from Maine
. Delivered to the United States Senate•. Washington, D.C, January JO, 1991

OR two centuries Americans have debated the relative
He was not required to seek the approval of Congress to
powers of the President and Congress. Often it has been order that deployment, and he did not do so.
an abstract argument. But today that debate is real The · But if he now decides to use those forces in what would
men who wrote the Constitution had as a central purpose the plainly be war he is legally obligated to seek the prior approval
prevention of tyranny in America. They had lived under a of Congress.
The President has the authority to act in an emergency, and
British king. They did not want there ever to be an American
king. They were brilliantly successful. In our history there have . to authorize our forces to defend themselves if attacked. But,
been 41 presidents and no kings.
that's not what's now at issue.
Two days ago, the President in writing requested that ConThe writers of our Constitution succeeded by creating a
government with separate institutions and divided powers. · gress authorize him to implement the United Nations ResoThey correctly reasoned that if power were sufficiently dis-' lution authorizing "all necessary means" to expel Iraq from
persed, no institution or individual could gain total power.
Kuwait.
Nowhere has their concept been more severely tested than
But yesterday the President said that, in his opinion, he
in what they regarded as one of the greatest powers of gov- needs no such authorization from the Congress. I believe the
ernment - the power to make war.
correct approach was the one taken by the President two days
The Constitution- designates the President as Commander ago when he requested authorization. His request clearly
in Chief of the Armed Forces. With that designation comes acknowledged the need for Congressional approval.
the authority to direct the deployment of those forces.
The Constitution of the United States is not and cannot be
. But the Constitution also grants to th~ Congress the author- subordinated to a United Nations resolution.
1ty to raise and suppor~ ·amiies and· to ·declare war.
So today the Senate undertakes a solemn Constitutional
This division of authority '\Vas a decision consciously reached . responsibility: To decide whether to commit the nation to war.
by the framers of the Constitution. The earliest draft of the 'in this debate, we should focus on the fundamental question
Constitution would have empowered the Congress to "make before us: What is the wisest course of action for our nation
war," a greater grant of power than to "declare war." Itreflected in the Persian Gulf crisis?
the deep concern of the Founding Fathers about too great a
In its simplest form, the question is whether Congress 'IVi_l!
concentration of powers in a single pair of hands.
give the President an unlimited blank check to initiate war
When it was argued that this wording might prevent the agafnst Iraq, -at some unspecified time in the future, under
President from responding to an attack on this country, the circumstances which are not now known and cannot be foreConstitutional Convention agreed to share the power. After -seen;-or whether, while not ruling out the use of force if all
the Revolutionary War, the Founders knew that a legislative other
fail, we will no\V.iirge continuation of the policy
body could not direct the day-to-day operations of a war.
ofcoricened international economic and diplomatic pressure.
But they also knew that the decision to commit the nation to
·This is not a debate abOiifwhether force should ever be
war should not be left in the hands of one man. The clear intent used. No one proposes to rule out the use of force. We cannot
was to limit the authority of the President to initiate war.
and should not rule it out. The question is should war be truly
Our subsequent history has borne out their wisdom.
a last reson when all other means fail? Or should we start with
Acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief, President war, before other means have been fully and fairly ahausted?
~ush has deployed a vast American military force to the PerThis is not a debate about American objectives in the cursian Gulf.
rent aisis.
·

means
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There is broad agreement in the Senate that Iraq must, fully burden and a greater responsibility than other nations '11.ith an
and unconditionally, withdraw its forces from Kuwait.
equal or even greater stake in the resolution of the crisis.
The issue is how best to achieve that goal.
That's what's happening. And it's wrong.
It may become necessary to use force to expel Iraq from
Most Americans and most Members of Congress, myself
included, supported the President's initial decision to de- KuwaiL
_
ploy American forces to Saudi Arabia to deter further Iraqi
But because war is such a grave undertaking. with such
serious-Consequences, we must make certain that w-ar ls
aggression.
We supported the President's effort in marshalling inter- employed only as a last resort.
War carries with it great costs and high risk. An unknown
national diplomatic pressure and the most comprehensive
number of casualties and deaths; billions of dollars spent; a
economic embargo in history against Iraq.
I support that pol icy. I believe it remains the correct policy, greatly disrupted oil supply and oil price increases: a war poseven though the President abandoned his own policy before it sibly widened ~o i11dude lsra~!,J"urkey or other allies; the poshad time to work.
_slble lorigterm American occupation of Iraq; increased instaThe change began on Noveinber 8, when President Bush bilityinthePersianGulfregion;longlastingArabenmityagainst
announced that he was doubling the number of American the United States; a possible return to isolationism at home.
The grave decision for war is being made prematurely. This
troops in the Persian Gulf to 430,000 in order to attain a
"credible offensive option."
is hard to understand.
The President did not consult with Congress about that
The Administration has yet to explain wtiy war is necessary
decision. He did not try to build 'support for it among the now, when just. a couple of months ago, the Administration itself
said that sanctions and diplomacy were the proper course. There
American people." He jus_t did it.
In so doing, President Bush transformed the United States' · has been no clear rationale, no convincing explanation for shift.
· ,'ing American policy -from ·one of sanctions to one of wat
role and its risk in the Pe-rsian Gulf crisis.
In effect, the President - overnig!lt, with no consultation \ The policy of economic and diplomatic sanctions was the
and no public debate - changed American policy from being President's policy. He and other Administration officials
part of a collective effort to enforce economic and diplomatic repeatedly called it the best policy to pursue. They descnoed
sanctions into a predominantly American effort relying upon pq_sitively the effect that the sanctions were having on Iraq.
President Bush told a joint session of Congress in Septemthe use of American military force. By definition, sanctions
require many nations to participate and share the burden. ber that:
" ... these sanctions are working. Iraq is feeling the
War does not.
Despite the fact that his own policy of international ecoheat ... Iraq's leaders ... are cut off from world trade,
nomic sanctions was having a significant effect upon the Iraqi
unable to sell their oil, and only a tiny fraction of goods
economy, the President, without explanation. abandoned that
get through."
approach and instead adopted a policy based-first and foreThose were the President's words.
In October, Secretary of State Baker said sanctions must
most upon the use of American military force.
As a result, this country has been placed on a course toward remain the focus of American efforts. He said:
war.
" ... we must exercise patience as the grip of sanctions
tightens with increasing severity."
This has upset the balance of the President's initial policy,
the balance between resources and responsibilities, between _ Acc0rding to CIA Director William Webster, the policy of
sanctions is dealing a serious blow to the Iraqi economy. In
interests and risks, and between patience and strength.
Opposition to aggression is not solely an American value. It December, he testified that:
is universal. If there is to be war in the Persian Gulf, it should
"· , . all sectors of the Iraqi economy are feeling the
pinch of sanctions, and many industries have largely shut
not be a war in which Americans do the fighting and dying
down."
while those who benefit from our effort provide token help and
The President's initial policy against Iraq, to impose inter·
urge us on. Yet, as things now stand, that's what it would be.
The armed forces in the region should reflect the worldwide, national sanctions and enforce them using all necessary means,
concern about the problem. But they do not. Americans now\ is working - as CIA Director Webster detailed. He and others
make up more than three-fourths of the fighting forces in the. have noted that:
More than 90 percent of Iraq's imports and 97 percent of its
region. That's "-Tong and unfair. If this is to be an international
effort, it should be an international effort in more than name expons have been stopped.
Industrial production in Iraq has declined by 40 percent
only. Yet, as things now stand, th~t's what it could be: An
international effort in name only.
since August.
Many industries, including Iraq's only tire manufacturer,
Iraq must leave Kuwait. There's no disagreement about that.
Iraq must leave KuwaiL If necessary, it must be expelled; if have either closed or sharply reduced production due to th~
need be, by force of arms. There's no disagreement on that. shortage of industrial imports.
The flow of spare parts and military supplies from the Soviet
But in the event of war, why should it be an American war,
·made up largely of American troops, American casualties, Union and France, Iraq's major suppliers, has stopped.
Iraq's foreign exchange reserves have diminished drasticali};
and American deaths? We hope there is no war. But if there
iS, we hope _and pray that it will not be prolonged with many hindering its ability to purchase foreign goods from smugglers.
Food prices have skyrocketed. The Iraqi ·government has
casual tics.
Certainly the United States has a high responsibility to lead cut rations twice and has confiscated food on the open market.
Agricultural production has been weakened by the depar·
the international community in opposing aggression.
But this should not require the U.S. to assume a greater ture of foreign laborers.
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Lines have appeared at.government distribution points for and mothers, husbands and wives, daughters and sons - the
word "only" will have no meaning.
natural gas .
.-··clearly this policy is not failing. It is having a significanL
And the truly haunting question, which no one will ever be
effect on Iraq.
·
able to answer, will be: Did they die unnecessarily? For if we
Yet soon after the November 8 decision to deploy additional go to war now, no one will ever know if sanctions would have
tr00PS to the Persian Gulf, Administration officials suddenly worked if given a full and fair chance.
began expressing skepticism about whether the sanctions
The reality is that no course of action is free of risk. The
would have the desired effect. They argued that time was not prudent course now is to continue the President's initial policy
on our side, that the Iraqi military would be able to strengthen of economic sanctions.
its position in Kuwait.
Time io fortify Iraq's defenses will do little good if some of
Not only are these arguments the opposite of what the same Iraq's planes can't fly for lack of spare parts, if some of its
people were saying earlier, they are also not consistent with tanks can't move for lack of lubricants, if its infrastructure and
the assessment and projections of the Central Intelligence ability to wage war has been weakened.
Agency. Director Webster told the Congress in December that
If it eventually becomes necessary for the United States to
continued sanctions will have an increasingly damaging effect wage war, our troops would have benefited from the additional
not only on· the Iraqi economy, but also on the Iraqi military, time given for sanctions to degrade Iraq's military capabilities.
weakening it over time.
The sanctions are being enforced. They are having an effect
"The CIA estimated that continued sanctions will result in: on Iraq. We should continue their enforcement and seek to
The virtual depletion of Iraq's foreign exchange-reserves by enlarge their effect.
spring.
· .
..
I believe the best course now for the President and the
Multiplying. economic problems as Iraq transfer5 mere nation is tn·"stay the course," to continue the policy the Presresources to the military.
·
·
.
ident so clearly establi~ed at the outset of this crisis. It offers
The shutdown of nearly all but energy-related and military the best hope now for the achievement of our objectives at the
industries by the summer.
lowest Cost in lives and treasure. That is a goal we all share.
Increasing inflation combined with reduced rations.
A severe· re- lnction in basic commodities such as cooking TWO THEMES have recurred throughout this debate,
oils and sugar. ·
from both sides. First, the Senate is unanimous in
A reduction ·in the grain supply by half.
insisting that Iraq leave Kuwait. Iraq's invasion of
These effects will certainly weaken the Iraqi regime and Kuwait is brutal and illegal, should have been and was condegrade Iraq's military capabilities:
demned, and must be reversed. It will be reversed.
~decrease in the Iraqi Air Force's ability to fly regular
This is not a debate about that objective. It is a debate about
missions after three to six months, due to its dependence on how best to achieve that objective.
foreign equipment and technicians.
In its simplest form, the.question befqre us is whether ConA deterioration of the readiness of Iraq's ground and air gress will give to the President an unlimited blank check to
forces after nine months.
initiate war against Iraq, at some unspecified future time,
A reduction in the Iraqi military's transport and mobility underrueumstances which are not now known and cannot be
capabilities, due to shortages of critical supplies.
foreseen, or whether, while not ruling out the use of force if all
Given these effects of continued sanctions against Iraq, it is other means fail, we will now urge continuation of the policy
clear that time is on the side of the international coalition.
of concerted international economic and diplomatic pressure.
But the anticipation of war has obscured a rational analysis
The arguments for and against sanctions have been made in
uf the initial policy set forth by the President.
detail.
It is significant that even the Administration cannot and
I simply restate my firm conviction that _!!le best course now
does not say that the policy of sanctions has failed.
for the President and the nation is to "stay the course," to
To this moment, neither the President nor any member of continue the policy the President himself so clearly established
his Administration has said that sanctions have failed. In . at the outset of this crisis.
response to my direct question just a few days ago, both the \ That policy is hurting Iraq's economy and reducing its milSecretary of State and the Secretary of Defense acknowl- itary capability. It offers the best prospect for a peaceful soluedged that sanctions have not failed. But, they say, they can- tion, or, failing that, for weakening Iraq's military force.
not guarantee that sanctions will get Iraq out of Kuwait by · In short, the policy of continuing international diplomatic
January 15. Of course, no one has ever asked for such a and economic pressure against Iraq offers the best hope now
guarantee. Those who advocate continuing the policy of for achieving our common objective at the lowest cost in lives
sanctions recognize that it does not guarantee success by and treasure.
January 15 or any other time certain. It involves a risk. The
The second recurring theme in this debate is that no SenrislC· is that the international coalition will fall apart before ator wants war. We all know that to be true. No Senator wants
Iraq leaves Kuwait.
war. That is not the issue.
. But prematurely abandoning the sanctions and immediately
The issue is whether by our votes we authorize war, immegoing to war also involves risk. The ri~k there is foremost.in diately, warwith its great cost; war with its high risk, war which
human life. How many people will die? How many young could be aYOided, war which may be unnecessary.
Americans will die? That's a risk, a temble risk.
That's the issue.
Just this morning I heard it said that there may be "only" a
Let no one be under any illusions about the differences between
few thousand American casualties.
.
these C'AO resolutions. They are fundamentally different.
One authorizes immediate war. The other does not.
But for the families of those few thousand - the fathers
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That is the difference. That is the central issue we are voting
on today.
.
.
Those Senators who vote forthe second resolution are voting
to authorize war immediately. That is the very title of the resolution: ..Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq."
I understand the argument of those who support that resolution that they hope its passage prevents war.
But the reality is that if that hope is not realized, if immediate war docs occur, passage of that resolution will have been
an essential prerequisite for that war under our Constitution
and our democratic system.
.
The essence of democracy is accountability and if immediate war occurs, that resolution, and those who voted for it,
must share that accountabilicy.
The President has submitted to the Congress a written
request for authorization to use military force. That is the title
of the resolution. In the current circumstances clearly it would
be of such a scope and intensity that can only be descn"bed as.
war. So the second resolution is, plainly, by its
words, and
by the circumstances which exist in the Periian Gulf, ari authorization for war. .
Of that there can be no doubt or dispute. That is what wc
will be voting for, or against, today.
I urge my colleagues to vote against· authorizing an immediate war.
I have discussed two things we have heard a lot about. Let
me close by discussing something wc have heard little about.
It is this question: In the event of war, why should it be an
American war, made up largely of American troops, American
casualties, American deaths?
The first resolution, the Nunn Resolution, directly addresses
this concern by supporting "efforts to increase the military and
financial contnbutions made by allied nations."

Own

The second resolution does not mention the subject.
Certainly the United States has a high responsibility to lead
the international community in opposing aggression.
___ ,
But this should not require the United States to assume~a
greater role and a greater responsibiJity than other nations
with an equal or even greater stake in the resolution of this
crisis. That's what's happening. And it is wrong. · .
It may become necessary to use force to expel Iraq from
Kuwait.
But because war is such a grave undertaking, with such
serious Consequences, we should make certain that war is
employed only as a last resort.
· · ----.
· War carries with it great costs and high risk. The possibilities of spending billions of dollars; a greatly disrupted oil
supply and oil price increases; a war widened to include Israel,
Turke~ or other allies; the longterm American occupation of
.!raq; increased instability in the Persian Gulf region; longstanding Arab enmity against the United States; a return to
isolationism at home. All of these risks are there.
. - But .the largest risk, the greatest risk, the most profound risk
is 'th!lt of the loss of human life. How many people will die?
Haw many young Americans will die?
"And for the families of those young Americans who die, for
every one of us, the truly haunting question will be: Did they
die unnecessarily?
No one will ever be able to answer that question-. For if we
go to war now, no one will ever know if sanctions would have
worked if given a full and fair chance.
I urge my colleagues to vote for the first resolution, the
Nunn Resolution, to vote for continuing economic sanctions
and diplomatic pressure. I urge my colleagues to vote against
the second resolution, to vote against an authorization for
immediate war.

The Persian Gulf Crisis
By JOHN C. DANFORTH, United States Senator from Missouri

M

Delivered to the United States Senate, Washington, D.C., January JO, 1991

ADAM PRESIDENT, like all Illy colleagues, I have countries is Iraq. It is simply not sufficient to check the posbeen engaged in intensive soul-searching on how I sibility of terrifying aggression at one of its sources. We must
will vote on the question now before the Senate, be prepared to check terrifying aggression at all of its sources.
In Kuwait, Iraq is the aggressor, and its actions cannot be
whether to support the President if he determines force is'
necessary to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Throughout this soul- tolerated. Nearly all of us agree on this point. Iraq attacked its
neighboi; occupied its territory, and brutalized its people. It
searching, two convictions have been foremost in my mind.
First, I am convinced beyond a doubt that the United States has fielded a massive army with chemical and biological war·
must not allow the status quo in Kuwait to stand. Some have · fare capability that it has no compunctions about using. I~!!~~
argued that the President has not made a clear case for Amer- controls 20 percent of the world's prolo'.en oil reserves, and, if
ica's insistence that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait, but for undeterred, it could control an additional 25 percent of world
me the President's case is both crystal clear and overwhelm- . reserve$ in Saudi Arabia by conquest or intimidati°-n.
·
. - s~.me people have asked whether this confiict is not "just
ingly convincing.
_Jhis is the first major test of the post-cold-war wodd or~r, about:()il•.Tome, that is like askingwhetherit is not just about
Witnt_l'i_e re~ent collapse of the.SoViet Empire; the great threat oxygen. Like it °-!"not, our country, together with the _rest of the
wc have feared since 1945 is no longer real. The likelihood is . '"'5rld;-is utterly dependent on oil. Our ea>nomy, our jobs, our
z~i~!lt ..tbe Soviet Union will precipitate war by invading ability to defend ourselves are dependent on our access to oil.
Western Europe. But the events of August 2 have demon- To control the world's supply of oil is in a real sense to control
strated to all that to be rid of one threat does not make the the world. So what is involved in the Persian Gulf today is not
woi:.ld safe. A growing list of countries now possess or soon will only the preservation of the world order and the prevention of
p0ssess the instruments of mass_ destruction. One of those brutal aggression; it is the vital economic and security inter-
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ests of the United States and the rest of the world as well.
But, Madam President, after consulting with the best advice
for many years. commentators of various philosophical I can find, I have concluded that there is no comfort to be
stripes. especially liJteral commentators, have argued ~at the found in that proposition. It is clear to me that sanctions itlone
United States should not go it alone in the world. We sjl9ylr:t cannot reverse the status quo. Sanctions alone will cause sufnot take it '!pon ourselves to be the world's police.man. So the fering to the civilian population of Iraq but they
not force
eommentators have argued, with respect to Central America t~e_ Iraqi Anny from Kuwait. And causing suffering to a. civiland elsewhere, that our country should not act unilaterally; we ian population without military results should never be the
should work with other countries; we should address crises on objective of a civilized nation.
a multilateral basis.
I referthe Senate, as others have today, to the public testimony
This is exactly what President Bush has done with respect to of Director of Central Intelligence Webster before the House
the present crisis. He has gone repeatedly to the United Armed Services Committee on December 5, 1990. I ask unaniNations Security Council for approval of concerted action. He mous consent, as others have, Madam President, that a transcript
and Secretary of State Baker have consulted incessantly with of that testimony be printed in the Record at this point.
countries throughout the world. He has asked for and received
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be
the military and economic support of more than 20 nations. printed in the Record, as follows:
He has been widely acclaimed, especially by the liberals, for Sanctions in the Per.rilln Gulf
this multilateral approach.
Iraq, 11re Domestic Impact of Sanctions, December 4, 1990
It is argued that while many nations have done something,
few nations have done ·enough. I suppose this point yrould
you, Mr:. Chairman. I appreciate the opportu·
always.be made no matter what the degree of c:QII1fllitmen~ by·
a~dress this committee on what the intelligence
our partners. But what are we· to make of ~ch an argument?- .
. comm nity believes the sanctions have already aC:comThat multilateralism was a mistake after all? That no matter pliShed a.nd wl,lat we belji:ve the sanctions are likely to accombow assiduously pursued, it never really works?
plish over· time. Of c:Ourse, sanctions are only one type of
The advocates of multilateralism cannot have it both ways. · pressure being applied on Iraq, and their impact cannot be
They cannot applaud it one day, and jeer at it the nexL Would completely distinguished from the combined impact of mili·
that there were more leaders from the free world, but the fact tary. diplomatic, and economic initiatives on Iraq.
is that the United States is the leader. We are the one remainAt the technical level, economic sanctions and the embargo
ing world power. And if the United States now retreats from against Iraq have put Saddam Hussein on notice that he is
its commitment for a joint effort on the ground that others are isolated from the world community and have dealt a serious
not as strong or as firm as we are, all the efforts to seek Secu- blow to the Iraqi economy. More than lCJO countries are suprity Council resolutions and to consult with other governments porting the U.N. resolutions that impose economic sanctions
will ·have been an exercise of futility, recognized as such on Iraq. Coupled with the U.S. Government's increased ability
throughout the world.
to detect and follow up on attempts to circumvent the blockade,
The captain cannot abandon the ship. Having gained the the sanctions have all but shut off Iraq's exports and reduced
approval of so many other governments, some of which are on imports to less than 10 percent of their preinvasion level. All
the very border of Iraq and in great peril for their survival, .it sectors of the Iraqi economy are feeling the pinch of sanctions
is unthinkable .1h.a.t. our Government would.now .lose its will. and many industries have largely shut down. Most importantly,
H;ving urged the world to approve combined action, it is not the blockade has eliminated any hope Baghdad had of cashing
an option for the Congress of the United States to disapprove in on higher oil prices or its seizure of Kuwait oilfields.
what we for months have asked others to support.
Despite mounting disruptions and hardships resulting from
This then is my first conviction: We cannot accept Iraq's sanctions, Saddam apparently believes that he can outlast
occupation of Kuwait.
international resolve to maintain sanctions. We see no indiMy second conviction is that - war with Iraq would be a . cation that Saddam is concerned, at this point, that domestic
disaster we should do everything to avoid. I have belic:Ved and .. discontent is growing to levels that may threaten his regime or
I do believe that the negative consequences of·war far out- '·.that problems resulting from the sanctions are causing him to
weigh the positive. These negatives· have totally consumed my rethink his policy on KuwaiL The Iraqi people have experithinking and I have expressed them to the President and to key enced considerable deprivation in the past. Given the brutal
members of his administration.
nature of the Iraqi security services, the population is not
I foresee many casualties, the use of chemical weapons by likely to oppose Saddam openly. Our judgment has been, and
Iraq, terrorist strikes, Israel's involvement, and long-lasting continues to be, that there is no asssurance or guarantee that
turmoil· in· the Middle East. Repeatedly. I asked myself the economic hardships will compel Saddam to change his policies
same question: When we win the war,. then what happens? or lead to internal unrest that would threaten his regime.
What happens to the balance of power in the Middle East? To
Let me take a few minutes to review briefly with you some
_the-governance of Iraq? To the stability of friendly govern- of the information that led us to these conclusions, as well as
ments in Egypt and Saudi Arabia? Repeatedly I have come to to present our assessment of the likely impact of sanctions
the-Saiiieanswers. While the statuS quo is unacceptable, the over the coming months.
alternative of war is even worse.
··
· · ·
The blockade and embargo have worked more etfectively
'Bci:ause of this conclusion I have for some time believed than Saddam probably expected. More than 90 percent of
that if I had to vote on the matter, I would vote against autho- importsand97perccntofexportshave beenshutotf.Although
~ng the President to use military force. I have taken comfort there is smuggling across Iraq's borders, it is extremely small
Ill the proposition that we will so<>n be voting on it here in the
relative to Iraq's pre-crisis trade. Iraqi efforts to break sancSenate. Let us give sanctions a_ chance to work.
tions have thus far been largely unsuccessful. What little leak-
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age that has occurred is due largely to a relatively small num- We expect Baghdad's foreign exchange reserves to become
ber of private firms acting independently. We believe most extremely tight, leaving it little cash left with which to entice
countries arc actively enforcing the sanctions and plan to con- potential sanctions busters. At current rates of depiction, we
tinue doing so.
estimate Iraq will have nearly depicted its available foreign
Industry appears to be the hardest hit sector so far. Many exchange reserves by next spring. Able to obtain even fewer
firms are finding it difficult to cope, with the departure of key imports, Iraq's economic problems will begin to multiply
foreign workers and with the cutoff of imported industrial as Baghdad is forced to gradually shut down growing numbers
inputs - which comprised nearly 60 percent of Iraq's total of facilities in order to keep critical activities functioning as
imports prior to the invasion. These shortages have either shut long as possible. Economic conditions will be noticeably worse,
down or severely curtailed production by a variety of indus- and Baghdad will find allocating scarce resources a signifitries, including many light industrial and assembly plants as cantly more difficult task.
well as the country's only tire-manufacturing plant. Despite
Probably only energy-related and some military industries
these shutdowns, the most vital intjustries - including electric will still be fully functioning by next spring. This will almost
power generation and refining - do not yet appear threat- certainly be the case by next summer. Baghdad will try to keep
ened. We believe they will be able to function for some time basic services such as electric power from deteriorating. The
because domestic consumption has been reduced, because regime also will try to insulate critical military industries to
Iraqi and Kuwaiti facilities have been cannibalized and prevent an erosion of military preparedness. Nonetheless,
be.cause some stockpiles and surpluses already existed.
reduced rations, coupled with rapid infiation and little addiThe cutoff of Iraq's oil exports and the success of sanctions tional support from the Government will compound the ecoalso have choked off Baghdad's financial resources. This too -nomic .pressures facing most Iraqis.
·.BY. next spring, Iraqis will have made major changes in their
has been more effective and inore complete than Saddam
probably expected. Iii fact. we believe that a lack of foreign diets: Poultry, a staple of the Iraqi diet, will not be available;
exchange will, in time, be Iraq's greatest economic difficulty. · Unless Iraq receives humanitarian food aid or unless smugThe embargo has deprived Baghdad of roughly Sl.5 billion of gling increases, some critical commodities, such as sugar and
foreign exchange earnings monthly. We have no evidence that edible oils will be in short supply. Distribution problems are
Iraq has significantly augmented the limited foreign exchange likely to create localized shortages. But we expect that Baghreserves to which it still has access. As a result, Baghdad is dad will be able to maintain grain consumption - mainly
working to conserve foreign exchange and to devise alternative wheat, barley, and rice - at about two-thirds of last year's level
methods to finance imports.
until the next harvest in May.
The spring grain and vegetable harvest will again augment
We believe Baghdad's actions to forestall shortages offood
stocks - including rationing, encouraging smuggling, and food stocks, although only temporarily. To boost next year's
promoting agricultural production - are adequate for the food production, Baghdad has raised prices paid to farmers
next several months. The fall harvest of fruits and vegetables for their produce and decreed that farmers must cultivate all
is injecting new supplies into the market and will provide a available land. Nonetheless, Iraq does not have the capability
psychological as well as tangible respite from mounting pres-· to become self-sufficient in food production by next yeai:
surcs. The Iraqi population, in general, has access to sufficient Weather is the critical variable in grain production and even if
staple foods. Other foodstuffs - still not rationed - also it is good, Iraqis will be able to produce less than half the grain
remain available. However, the variety is diminishing and prices they need. In addition, Iraq's vegetable production next year
are sharply inflated. For example, sugar purchased on the open may be less than normal because of its inability to obtain seed
market at the official exchange rate went from S32 per 50 kilo- stock from al:!road. Iraq had obtained seed from the United
gram bag in August to $580 per bag last month. Baghdad States, The Netherlands, and France.
Although sanctions are hurting Iraq's civilian economy, they
remains concerned about its food stocks and, increasingly, to
divert supplies to the military. Iii late November, Baghdad cut are affecting the Iraqi millitary only at the margins. Iraq's
civilian rations for the second time since the rationing pro- fairly static, defensive posture will reduce wear and tear on
gram began, while announcing increases in rations for.military \military equipment and, as a result, extend the life of its inven'tory of spare parts and maintenance items. Under now-combat
personnel and their families.
On balance, the embargo has increased the economic hard- conditions, Iraqi ground and air forces can probably maintain
ships facing the average Iraqi. In order to supplement their near-current levels of readiness for as long as nine months.
We expect the Iraqi Air Force to feel the effects of the
rations, liaqis must turn to the black market, where most goods
can be purchased but at highly inflated prices. They are forced sanctions more quickly and to a greater degree than the Iraqi
to spend considerable amounts of time searching for reason- ground forces because of its greater reliance on high technolably priced food or waiting in lines for bread and otherrationed ogy and foreign equipment and technicians. Major repairs to
items. In addition, services ranging from medical care to san- sophisticated aircraft like the F-1 will be achieved with sigitation have been curtailed. But these hardships are easier for nificant difficulty, if at all, because of the exodus of foreign
Iraqis to endure than the combination of economic distress, technicians. Iraqi technicians, however, should be able to mainhigh casualty rates, and repeated missile and air attacks that tain current levels of aircraft sorties for three to six months.
The Iraqi ground forces arc more immune to sanctions.
Iraqis lived with during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. During
this war. incidentally, there was not a single significant public Before the invasion, Baghdad maintained large inventories of
disturbance even though casualties hit 2.3 percent of the total basic military supplies, such as ammunition, and supplies prob-;
Iraqi population - about the same as the percentage of U.S. ably remain adequate. The embargo will eventually hurt Iraqi
casualties during the Civil War.
·
armor by preventing the replacement of old fire-control syste11'.5
Looking ahead, the economic picture changes somewhat. and creating shortages of additives for various critical lubn-
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can be maintained. This is especially true if Iraq does not
believe a coalition attack is likely during this period. Iraq's
predict the gradual deterioration of the Iraqi economy, it is
infantry and artillery forces - the key elements of Iraq's
initial defense - probably would not suffer significantly
1110re difficult to assess how or when these conditions will
cause Saddam to modify his behavior: At present, Saddam
as a result of sanctions. Iraq could easily maintain the
aJinost certainly assumes that he is coping effectively with the
relatively simple Soviet-style weaponry of its infantry and
sanctions. He appears confident in the ability of his security
artillery units and can produce virtually all of the ammuservices to contain potential discontent, and we do not believe
nition for these forces domestically. Moreover, these
be is troubled by the hardships Iraqis will be forced to endure.
forces will have additional opportunity to extend and
Saddam's willingness to sit tight and try to outlast the sancreinforce their fortifications along the Saudi border,_
tions or, in the alternative, to avoid war by withdrawing from
thereby increasing their defensive strength."
Kuwait will be determined by his total assessment of the polit·
The Director then says:
ical, economic, and military pressures arrayed against him.
"On balance, the marginal decline of combat power in
Baghdad's armored units probably would be offset by the
HE conclusion of Director Webster is that sanctions in
simultaneous improvement of its defensive fortifications.
themselves will not lead to the overthrow of Saddam
Iraq's Air Force and air defenses arc more likely to be
Hussein, and that they will not lead him to change his
hit far more severely than its army, if effective sanctions
palicy toward Kuwait. The Director states that if Saddam Husarc maintained for another 6 to 12 months. This degrasein decides to withdraw from Kuwait, that decision, and I quote,
dation will diminish Iraq's ability to defend its strategic
"will be determined by his total assessment of political,
assets from air attack and reduce its ability to conduct
similar attacks. on its neighbors. It would have only a
economic, and military pressures arrayed against him."
marginal impact on Saddam's ability to hold Kuwait and
It is my privilege to serve on the Select Committee on Intelligencc. I am precluded, of course, from divulging classified
southern Iraq. The Iraqi Air Force is not likely to play
a major role in any battle for Kuwait.
information I have received in briefings in that committee.
However, I am free to state my own conclusions on the basis
Our judgment remains that even if sanctions continue
of my total understanding. My conclusion is this. Standing by
to be enforced for an additional 6 to 12 months, ecothemselves and without the credible threat of military force,
nomic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to
sanctions have no chance of expelling Iraq from Kuwait.
retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popuSomc have argued that sanctions would over time weaken
Jar discontent in Iraq."
Iraq's military position and make an eventual confiict less costly
So is time on our side, Madam President, as I have long
to American forces. But this assumption is not borne out by . wanted to believe? I cannot persuade myself that this was any
the best available advice, including Director Webster's public more than wishful thinking on my part.
testimony. The Director states that "Under known combat
What happens for the next 9 months or a year, or more than
conditions, Iraqi ground and air forces can probably maintain a year; as we vainly wait for the Iraqis to leave their fortificanear current levels of readiness for as long as 9 months." He tions? Do we keep more than 400,000 troops in place through
- further states that the Iraqi Air Force would feel the effects of Ramadan, through the Hadj, through the summer? And if so,
sanctions to a greater degree than ground forces, which arc what happens to their readiness, their support by the Amermorc immune to sanctions, but it is ground forces that dug into ican people, their acceptance by the Muslim masses? To ask
Kuwait in massive numbers and it has been said that ground these questions is to answer them.
forces have never been defeated by air superiority alone.
To wait for sanctions to work is to wait while we get weaker
Madam President, I know that there have been various a!ld Iraq bides its time. The one and only chance to accomplish
interpretations offered in the Senate about exactlywhat Direc- .. our objectives without war is to maintain sanctions accompator Webster said in his testimony on December 5. It could be nied by a credible military threat. Without a credible military
said that he testified that sanctions work, Madam President, if threat, our alternative is sanctions followed by nothing at all.
the meaning of "wcirk~ is to infiict pain oil civilians, that con- \The key to peace is maintaining a credible military threat, and
clusion is absolutely corrcet. But there is no way to read the this is precisely the point our pending votes will address. Those
testimony of Director Webster-oilDecember 5 and come out who would give sanctions a chance before military action is even
with a conclusion that the sanctions offer any possibility of possible v.uuld decouple the two components which must be kept
removing Iraq from Kuwait in the foreseeable future.
linked, if wc have any chance of getting Iraq out of Kuwait with·
I would like to quote just a few excerpts from the letter that out a fight. They v.uuld foreclose any possioility of a just peace.
Director Webster has written today to Chairman Aspin, of the
This is why I cannot vote for sanctions alone. This is why I
House Armed Services Committee. These arc the words of cannot ..ute to deprive the President of the credible threat of
William Wcbster.First,characterizinghistestimonyofDccem- force. It is indeed a supreme irony that it is only through the
her 5, he said:
·
threat of force that a stable world can be maintained. But that
"I also testified that there was no evidence that sane- is an irony wc have recognized ever since World War II.
tions would mandate a change in Saddam Hussein's
Madam President, I do believe that Saddam Hussein pays
·behavior and that there was no evidence when or even if attention to what we do and say in the Senate. I do believe that
the President's credibility is our best hope, if we arc to prcthey would force him out of Kuwait."
And then the Director goes on and says this:
serve a stable world without war: We will soon vote to enhance
"The ability of the Iraqi ground forces to defend Kuwait that credibility or to undercut it.
I will support the President with my ..utes and with my
and Southern Iraq is unlikely to be substantially eroded
over the next 6 to 12 months even if effective sanctions prayers.

Mi: Chairman, while we can look ahead several months and
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The Persian Gulf Crisis

I

By SAM NUNN, U.S. Senator from Georgia .
Delivered to the Senate, Washington, D.C., January 10, 1991

T is regrettable that because of Iraqi intransigence, the term but also long term. Many of us strongly believe a war to
meeting in Geneva this week with Secretary Baker pro- liberate Kuwait should be the last resort and that sanctions
duced no diplomatic breakthrough and very little that was and diplomacy combined with a threat - a continuing threat
encouraging. I noted with interest - and I must say with almost of force - should be given more time. Should we give the
complc:te_ amazement·_: that the Iraqi Foreign_Ministei_ President - after all of these debates when the die is cast _
refused to accept President Bush's letter to Saddam Hussein should we give him blanket authority to go to war against Iraq
because the letter, according to the Foreign Minister, w'as SUJl-:. to liberate Kuwait? This is the question we face. There are
posedly not polite. I have not.seen President Bush's lettei: But numerous questions that will have to be answered in the minds
I find that Iraqi protest both ironic and, indeed, repulsive.
of each of us before casting our vote.
Was it polite when Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons
The first question I try to ask when it comes to matters of
againSthis own people2..Ancl.then~again, against Iran? Was fr war and peace is the question of whether a particular situation
Polite'°whe? I~aqi forces laun~hed a brutal, unprovoked in~ is vital to our Nation's security. In this case, is the liberation of
sion of Kuwait? Was it polite when Iraqi forces used savage Kuwait vital to our Nation '.s security? We all agree with the goal
0Qlence against innocent Kuwaiti Civilians and took hostage of restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty; no doubt about that. But
innocent foreigriefs residing in that country?
have we concludecl--here that the liberation of Kuwait in the
-Saddam Hussein and his top spokesmen do not have the
few weeks is so vital to our Nation's security that we must
standing .in the court of world opinion to raise the issue of take military action now instead of waiting a few months -;
politeness.
·
waiting a period pf time to allow the economic embargo and
Mr. President, I still believe there is room for some hope blockage to take its toll?
that diplomacy can succeed in avoiding war. But as January
Back in August and September when the embargo was sue:
15th approaches, as so many of my colleagues have already cessfully - and I'd say very skillfully brought about by Presobserved, the Congress must act. Article 1, section 8 of the ident Bush, through what I think was his superb leadership -:
Constitution provides that the Congress clearly has the author- no one thought or predicted the embargo was going to be over
ity and the duty to decide whether the Nation should go towai: by January. No one predicted we were going to be able to bring
In many past instances it is true that military actions have about the termination of Iraqi presence in Kuwait by January.
occurred without congressional authorization. Pursuant to the None of the intelligence experts or other experts who testified
authority assumed by the President in his constitutional capac- felt the embargo was really going to have much effect before
ity as Commander-in-Chief in today's fast-moving, intercon- April or May of 1991 and almost all of them said it would take
nected world with instant communications, a world plagued at least a year. There was no surprise about that. I'm absolutely
with nuclear weapons and international terrorism, there are amazed when people say well, we've waited four months and
certainly instances when United States military force must be five months and the embargo is not working. They must not
used without congressional authorization.
have been there at the beginning or they must not have talked
There are many gray areas where the Congress, by necessity, to anybody at the beginning about how long it was going to
has permitted and even encouraged and supported military take. It's very puzzling to me bow someone could give up on
action by the Commander-in-Chief without specific authori- the embargo after five months when nobody that I know of
zation and without a declaration of war. I do not deem every predicted that it was going to last less than nine months to a
military action taken as war. I think there is always room for year, and most people said a year to eighteen months from the
debate on definitions. But a war against Iraq to liberate Kuwait time of inception, which was August of last year.
initiated by the United States and involving over 400,000
When we talk about the question of vital - a lot of times
American forces is not a gray area.
' we in Washington throw that word around as if it's just another
In this case, I believe the Constitution of the United States word. Sometimes we use so many words in the course of debate
is absolutely cleai: It is essential, to comply with the Consti- that we don't think carefully about what we mean. I recall very
tution and to commit the Nation, that Congress give its con- clearly.President Reagan's 1982 declaration that Leba_no~ w_~
sent before the President initiates a large-scale military offen- vital.J_o_ the security of the United States. Shortly ther~er,
sive against Iraq. I think the founding Fathers had a great deal following the tragic death of more than 200 Marines, we pulle~
of wisdom when they put this provision in the Constitution. ou( of Lebanon, we pulled out of a country that only a few
One of the main reasons, of course, was to prevent one person weeks before had been declared vital. Today, as we debate this.
from being King. They did not want that. But I also believe eight years later, while pursuing our newly proclaimed vital
that there was another purpose, and that is to make sure that interest in KuwaiL It was not vital before August 2nd. Nobody
when this Nation goes to war and asks its young men and, had said it was vital then. There was no treaty. In fact, when
increasingly, young women also to put their lives on the line, we were protecting Kuwaiti vessels coming out of the Gulf for
the Nation must commit itself before we ask them to lay down several years during the Iran/Iraq war, the Kuwaitis didn't even
their lives.
let us refuel, as I recall I'd have to be checked on that one but
·
- :
The President's January 8th request that Congress approve that's my recollection.
All of a sudden it's vital - vital. And while this embargo bas
the use of military force presents Congress with an issue, simply stated, but profound in is consequences; not simply short been undertaken since August 2nd, and while we all seem to
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take for granted that the liberation of Kuwait is vital, not just Last August, President Bush asserted himself, saying, quoting
in general but in the next 2 or 3 or 4 weeks - while that's been him "Eamomic sanctions, in this instance, if fully enforced, can
going on, our Government· has watched passively, said very be very, very efi"ective .•• and nobody can stand up forc:o.·er to
little if anything, while our former enemy, a nation on the total economic deprivation." That is from President Bush.
terrorist list for years and years and I believe it still is - Syria
The international sanctions are, indeed, having a devastating _
- used its'military power to consolidate its control over Lcb- _efi"ect on !i:_aq's econom~ for_!WO basic reasons. The ir.iqi
anon. the same country that was our vital interest in 1982. So omy is based on oil, which accounts for about SO pe!Unt <?f_~he
one of our so-called vital interests, Lebanon, eight years ago, country's GNP and almost 100 percent of the country's hard
is now under the control of Syria, while we have pursued currency earnings. Iraq is essentially landlocked, dependent
another vital interest.
upon oil pipelines, foreign ports, and international highways for
The point is, not all these things are simple. The point is we its imports and exports. As Georgetown University specialist on
ought to be careful about defining vital. A lot of things are economic sanctions Dr: Gary Hufbaucr testifies before Senate:important, very important, that arc;n't vital. Vital in the sense
"On no previous occasion have sanctions attracted
of young men and young women being called to put their lives
the degree of support thay have in the Iraqi case. Never
on the line.
have they been so comprehensive in· their coverage._
In more recent history, we defined Panama and Nicaragua
Never have they imposed such enormous costs on the
as vital, and we used force in the case of P.!1na111a directly. In
target country. Moreover, Iraq's economy, geographically
the case or-Nicarag~a, we supported force. I supporteq both
_isolated and skewed as it is toward oil, is far more vulof those decisions. But after achieving our short-teim goals in .
nera!:>Je to. economic coercion than other economies have
both .these countries - we arrested Noriega and we cheeresf
, ·.been the' target ·of SJ?ctions."
.
the election of President Chamorro ...,. we seem to have for- ·- The net result" to date is that the international sanctions
gotten their on-going economic and political agony. Th~ Were have cu,t off more than 90 percent of Iraq's imports, almost 100
countries in which we used or supported force for one reason percent of Iraq's exports, including virtually all of Iraqi oil
or the other: Again I supported it in both cases. And now, exports. Iraqi industrial and military plants are receiving from
while we're pursuing another vital interest, they are going abroad virtually no raw materials, no spare parts, no new
through economic and political wrenching experiences with ·. equipment, no munitions, no lubricants. Moreover, Iraq now
the outcome being very uncertain. Both the Bush Adminis- has no way to earn hard currency to purchase desperately
tration and the Congress have unfulfilled responsibilities needed imports, even if they can be smuggled in spite of the
regarding those two countries.
embargo. "Amstel Light" beer may be available in Baghdad,
My point is, Mr. President, we throw around the world "vital" but it is a very poor substitute for such essentials as motor oil
very carelessly. When politicians declare an interest to be vital, and transmission fluid.
our men and women in uniform arc expected to put their lives
The key to a meaningful embargo is oil: so long as Iraq·s oil
at risk to defend that interest. They train for years to be able to · expons arc shut down - and no one disputes that they are
go out and, if necessary, give their Jives to protect what we shut do""11, no one; that is not in dispute - Saddam Hussein
decalre to be vital. Sometimes when you sec how quickly we will be deprived of at least half of his country's GNP and
come to use that term, it makes you wonder whether we are essentiallyallofhishardcurrcncyincome.Solongasoilexports
fulfilling our responsibility to those men and women in uniform. are shut down, he will become progressively weaker - there
We have an obligation as leaders to distinguish between impor- is.no doubt about that. We worry about recession in the United
tant interests which are worthy of economic, political, and dip- States - we worry right now about a recession - we're talking
lomatic clforts and interests that arc vital, that are worth the about whether the economy of the United States is going down
calling by the leaders of this Nation on our young men and 3-5 percent of our G~P. and it's of great and legitimate conwomen in uniform to sacrifice, if necessary, their lives.
cern. Saddain Hussein has to worry about a devastating reducFormer Secretary of Defense and former CIA Director James tion of approximately 70 percent of his GNP by the summer of
Schlesinger spoke to this very point when he testified before our this year. By the end of this summer, the country will be an
Committee. He testified that he did.not think liberation of economic b.asket case, and I mean Iraq and Saddam Hussein
Kuwait "was a vital interest on the 2nd day of August, 1990." Dr. may be in jeopardy with his own people.
Schlcsingci; howevei; went on to say, quoting him again:
The question is: can anyone guarantee that Iraq will aban. " ••• the investment of the prestige of the President of don Kuwait when their GNP goes down 70 percent? Can anythe United States now makes it vital (he does not use the body guarantee that? The answer is no. We can't guarantee
word "vital" lightly) for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. I that. But the other options we have also must be held to the
do not think that it is necessary, to achieve that objective, same standard. A sanctions policy is not perfect. There arc no
forustoturntowa&lthinkthatwccanavoidwarandstill guarantees here. But it has to be weighed against the alterachieve the objective of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait." natives. The Bush Administration is correct when they point
This brings up the next question.
out that sanctions do not guarantee that Iraq will leave Kuwait.
Are there reasonable alternatives to war? What is the like- But the story docs not end there. What guarantees do we have
lihood that sanctions will work? In testimony before the Con- that the war will be brief and that American casualties will be
Kress, and in public and private statements as recently as Jan- light? No one can say whether a war will last five days, five
uary 3, the Bush Administration stopped short of saying that weeks, or five months. We know we can win, and we will win.
sanctions cannot get Iraq out of Kuwait. The Administration There is no doubt about that. There is no doubt about who
acknowledges the significant economic impact sanctions have ·wins this wu Our policy and our military planning, howcvci;
hadonlraqbutnowsaysthcn:is"noguarantce"whcthcrornot cannot be based on an expectation that the war will be contheywillbringaboutanlraqidecisiontowithdrawfromKuwait. eluded quickly and easily. In large measure, the scope and
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scale of the hostilities, once begun, will be determined by where in the world. We should take full advantage of the coaIraq's willingness to absorb massive punishment and to fight lilion's superiority in air and sea powei; while establishing the
on. A quick Iraqi 1n1litary collapse is possible in days. We hope capability of deploying additional ground forces to the region
it will happen if war comes. But it cannot be assured.
quickly if needed.
The Administration argues that the coalition may crumble
I find it puzzling, howevei; Mr. President, that proponents of
before Iraq withdraws from Kuwait. The Senator from Loui- our early military option voice concern about the degradation
siana, my good friend, referred to that. Admiral William of our 400,000-strong force, fully backed by the United States
Crowe, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff', took and supported by numerous allies, yet at the same time, those
this issue head-on during his testimony before the Armed Ser· favoring authorization of an early military offensive minim~
vices Committee last November. Quoting Admiral Crowe, the the degradation of Iraq's 500,000-man force in the Kuwaiti
immediate past Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, "It is hard to theatei; a force essentially supported only by Iraq, totally lackunderstand," he said, "why some consider our international ing significant allies and subjected to a remarkably elfective
alliance strong enough to conduct intense hostilities, but too international embargo.
· ·
fragile to hold together while we attempt a peaceful solution."
Mr. President, in weighing the costs of the military option,
Mr. President, the Administration's position is that if we wait one must also consider our long-term interests in the region.
for sanctions to work, Kuwait and its citizens will be funher Has there been any in-depth analysis in the Administration
victimized. Tragi~ this is no doubt true. But to quote Admiral about what happens in the Middle East after we win? And we .·
Crowe again: "War is not neat, not tidy; once you resort to it. war will win. The President's declared goals include establishing :
isu.ncertainandamess."Theadditional.costtoKuwaitofletting stability in the Persian Gulf and protecting U.S. citizens
sanctions work must be-:weighed again$t the cost to ~uY'illt in .•abrpad. G9nsjg~_ring the wave of Islamic reaction, anli-Amerterms of hum~n Jives, human sulferlng'. !!-~ weH- as national· 1.icanisfri an9. tcrrorisnHhal_ is likely lo be unleashed by a high I}!
· resources, if
United States-leq coalition launches a "military Cleittilctive war. With many Arab ·casualties, it is difficult to
olfensive to liberate a countty, which is heavily fortified: .
":ionceive of tJ:ie Middle East as a more stable region where
Mr. President, those who support prompt militarfliction Americans will be safe.
Finally, the Administration has argued there is no guaran·
argue that delay will allow Iraq to strengthen its defensive
positions in Kuwait, thereby adding to the eventual cost of tee economic hardships will in the end compel Saddam Husforcing Iraq out of Kuwait. A couple of observations on this sein to withdraw from Kuwait. Mr. President, I have attended
point. This would have been a better argument in September Intelligence Community as well as Defense and State Depart·
and October of last year than it is today. Iraq already has had ment briefings for 18 years. I have been thinking back. I cannot
five months to dig in and to fortify and they have done so in recall one instance where I ever came out of those briefings
a major way. Kuwait has fortifications reminiscent of World with any guarantee of anything. For the Intelligence Commu·
War I. This argument also overlooks the costs to the Iraqi nity to say they can't guarantee that Iraq is going to get out of
military of sitting in Kuwait with a 500,000-man force while Kuwait because of the sanctions which is going to reduce his
logistical support degrades because of the sanctions.
GNP by 70 percent and cut olf all the hard currency, for them
Mr. President, I am aware Director Webster sent Congress- to say that is true. Nobody can guarantee it. But what else have
man Les Aspin a letter on January 10 that addressed this issue. they guaranteed? I haven't seen any guarantees on any subject
I read the Webster letter as confirming that the sanctions, if from the Intelligence Community. It's not their fault. They're
kept in place for six to twelve months, will severely degrade not in the business of guaranteeing. The CIA is not the FDIC.
Iraq's armored forces, air force and air defenses. I consider They give you the factS, then you use common sense to come
that good news. For some unexplained reason, and I'm sure to conclusions.
In summary, Mr. President, I believe that on balance there
people will have a reason, but I find it puzzling now because
I don't understand what it is, Judge Webster implies that Iraq's is a reasonable expectation that continued economic sanctions,
tanks, its air defenses, and its over 700 combat aircraft will not backed up by the threat of military force and international
play an important role in Iraq's defense of Kuwait: i would isolation, can bring about Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. 1
certainly ~ate to iry·to explain this"to several hundred Amer.~ believe that the risks associated with continued emphasis on
ican pilots that are out there, the Air Force and Navy pilots, sanctions are considerably less than the very real risks associ·
who have the job of putting their lives in their aircraft at risk ated with war and, most importantly, the aftermath of war in
to knock out these very targets at the beginning stage of any a very volatile region of the world.
Many of my constituents in Georgia have written and called
conflict. I don't understand the Webster letter, frankly. Perhaps we will get more from that later. But it's incredible to me and asked me whether this is another Vietnam. Arc we about
that he seems to write otI the importance of the tanks, the to get into another Vietnam? No. I do not believe so. I agree
aircraft, and the air defenses. Everything I've heard is that we with President Bush and other Administration spokesmen who
are going to have to make those the priority targets, among assure us that a burgeoning Persian Gulf confiict will not be
others. And to write those otI and say that degrading them is another Vietnam. I think they are right on that. The territory
really not going to play a big role to me is bewildering. But of Iraq and Kuwait is dilferent in most respects from that of
Vietnam, particularly in terms of geography and vulnerabili~
we'll wait and hear from Director Webster at a later point.
Supporters of prompt military action argue that our olfen- to air attack and economic embargo. Iraq is vulnerable to 111'
sive military capability will degrade if our huge force sits for attack. The conditions of warfare will be vastly ditierent frolll
months in the Saudi desert. This is also true, and for several those in Vietnam.
·
·Of course there are military lessons we should remem~r
months I have suggested that we should institute a policy of
unit rotation, commencing with quick reaction forces, such as from Vietnam. We should hit military targets at the outset with
the 82nd Airborne, that might be needed on short notice else- overwhelming and awesome powei; at the beginning of any ·
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conflict, as well as knocking out power and communications,
nuclear, biological. and chemical facilities.
At the same time, we should not "overlearn" the Vietnam
lesson. We in America like instant results. We want-fast food
and
~~nt fast military victories. However, our Nation places
a much higher value on human life, especially on the lives-of
·our-men and _women jn uniform. Depending :UJ?On developmenis after the first wave of air attacks. a short war may be
possible and may save" lives, but we must avoid an "instant
victory" kind of psychology with demands and expectations i_n
this country that could cause a premature and high casualty
assault on heavily fortified Kuwait by American ground forces.
We don't want to create a psychology that puts preuure on our
military commanders in the field to do things that are foolish
because we think they should get it over with quickly. We hope
they will be able to do it with a minimum loss of life.
But if war becomes necessaiy, we should not tell our military
commanders to get it over with quickly. no matter what. No. The
order should be to acmmplish the mission with whatever force is
required, but do so in a way that minimizes American casualties,
even if inalces more time. Making continued Iraqi occupation.of
Kuwait untenable with air and naval bombardment plays to our
strengths. Rooting out the Iraqi army with ground forces going
against heavy fortification plays right into Iraq's hands.
Mr. President, in conclusion, a message to Saddam Hussein:
You are hearing an impassioned debate emanating from the
U.S. Capitol, both the House and the Senate. These are the
voices of Democracy. Don't misread the debate. If war occurs,
the Constitutional and policy debates will be suspended and
Congress will provide the American troops in the field whatever they need to prevail. There will be no cutoff of funds for
our troops while they engage Iraq in battle. President Bush,
the Congress, and the American people are united that you
must leave Kuwait. We differ on whether these goals can best
be accomplished by administering pain slowly with an economic blockade or by dishing it out in large doses with military
power. Either way, Saddam Hussein, you lose.
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Mr. President, in concluding, and in closing, I can think of
no better person to quote than General Norman Schwarzkopf,
Commander of U.S. forces in_ the Gulf, who will bear the heavy
responsibility of leading American forces into combat, if war
should occur.
On the question of patience, General Schwarzkopf said in
mid-November in an intervit;)Y, quoting him:
"If the alternative to dying is sitting out in the sun for
anoiher·summer, then that's not a bad alternative."
On the qiiestii:>n of cost of waiting for sanctions to work,
General Schwalzkopf also said in an interview in November,
quoting him:
"I really don't think there's ever going to come a time
when time is on the side of Iraq, as long as the sanctions
are in effect, and so long as the United Nations coalition
is in effect."
On the question of effect of sanctions, General Schwarzkopf said in October - and this is immediately prior to a
major switch in the Administration's policy - immediately
prior to it - quoting General Schwarzkopf:
"Right now, we have people saying, 'OK, enough of this
business; let's get on with it.' Golly, the sanctions have
only been in effect about a couple of months•... And now
we are starting to see evidence that the sanctions are
pinching. So why should we say 'OK. we gave them two
months, they didn't work. Let's get on with it and kill a
whole bunch of people.' That's crazy. That's crazy."
End quote, from the Commander in the field.
Mr. President, in closing, I believe that before this Nation is
committed to what may be a large-scale war, each of us in the
Senate of the United States in reaching a decision which will
be very personal and very difficult for all of us, we should ask
ourselves a fundamental question: will I be able to look at the
parents, the wives, the husbands, and children in the eye and
say their loved ones sacrificed their lives for a cause vital to the
United States, and that there was no other reasonable alternative? MJ:. President, at this time, I cannot.

